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Heather McLeod-Kilmurray*

Proceeding With (Pre)Caution:
Environmental Principles as
Interpretive Tools in Applications
For Pre-trial Injunctions

In many cases of imminent environmental harm, a trial may take years. To prevent
harm in the meantime, pre-trial injunctions are essential. The author highlights
the important role of interlocutory injunctions in Canadian environmental litigation,
uncovers the judicial assumptions and attitudes toward the environment which
these decisions reveal, and proposes a precautionary approach to interpreting
the interlocutory injunction test in environmental cases. She argues that prevailing
judicial attitudes and presumptions in relation to environmental claims often
negatively influence how the discretionary elements in procedural rules governing
pre-trial injunctions are applied. Although there has been much analysis of
principles such as the precautionary principle in substantive environmental law,
the author argues that if substantive law is to achieve its intended goals, principles
such as precaution must also be applied when interpreting procedural rules. In
environmental litigation, ecological realities and environmental law principles
should guide discretion, particularly in decisions which appear. to be "merely
procedural" yet have significant substantive effect.
Dans beaucoup de cas de dommages imminents . I'environnement, un
proc~s risque de s'6tirer pendant des ann~es. Entre temps, pour empecher les
dommages, des injonctions pr6liminaires sont essentielles. L'auteure souligne
le r6le important des injonctions interlocutoires dans les litiges en matiere
environnementale au Canada, met en evidence les postulats pos6s par les
tribunaux et les attitudes de ces demiers concernant Ienvironnement tel que le
tout est revle par ces decisions; elle propose ensuite une approche bas6e sur
le principe de precaution pour accorder une injonction interlocutoire dans les
affaires concernant I'environnement. L'auteure allegue que les attitudes et les
postulats des tribunaux face aux revendications en matiere d'environnement ont
souvent une influence n~gative sur I'application des elements, discretionnaires
des regles de procedure qui rdgissent les injonctions prdliminaires. Malgr6
I'abondance d'analyses des principes, par exemple du principe de pr6caution
en droit substantif de I'environnement, I'auteure allegue que si Ion veut que le
droit substantif atteigne ses objectifs, les principes - notamment le principe de
precaution- doivent aussi 6tre appliques au moment d'interpreter les regles de
proc6dure. Dans les litiges en matiere d'environnement, les realites 6cologiques
et les principes du droit de Ienvironnement doivent orienter l'exercice du pouvoir
discretionnaire, particulierement dans les decisions qui, mume si elles ne semblent
6tre que - purement procedurales - ont n6anmoins des effets r6els importants.
* Heather McLeod-Kilmurray, Associate Professor, Environmental Law Group, University of
Ottawa Faculty of Law. This work began as part of a doctoral thesis and thanks therefore go to the
SSHRC and the University of Toronto Faculty of Law for their financial support of that project, to
Profs. Lome Sossin, Jutta Brunnre and Andrew Green for their detailed feedback, as well as Chris
Tollefson (Professor of Law & Executive Director, Environmental Law Centre, Faculty of Law,
University of Victoria) and Ingrid Leman Stefanovic (Director of the Centre for Environment and
Professor, University of Toronto Philosophy). I also thank colleagues Lynda Collins and Penelope
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Introduction
In many cases of imminent environmental harm, a trial on the issues
may take months or years to be heard, let alone finally decided. The
most essential mechanism available to prevent such harm is the pre-trial
injunction. Preliminary or interlocutory injunctions are among the most
important environmental procedures, and a key element of environmental
enforcement. Yet prevailing judicial attitudes and presumptions in
relation to environmental claims often negatively influence how the many
discretionary elements in procedural rules are interpreted and applied.
Although there has been much analysis of environmental law principles
such as the Precautionary Principle in substantive environmental law, this
paper argues that if substantive law is to achieve its intended goals, these
principles must also be applied when interpreting procedural rules.'

1. A condensed version of the main argument and case study covered in detail here appears in
"Lowering Barriers to Judicial Enforcement: Civil Procedure and Environmental Ethics," forthcoming
Nov. 2010 in the IUCN Academy of Environmental Law Research Series (Edward Elgar) [McLeodKilmurray, "Lowering Barriers"]. That paper is a summary of the general argument of my doctoral
dissertation: The Process of Judging the Environment: Civil Procedure, Environmental Ethics
and their Effects on Environmental Law (S.J.D. Thesis, University of Toronto Faculty of Law,
2007) [unpublished]. Previous publications discussing the substantive effects of procedure and the
importance of judicial attitudes and environmental principles include "Hollick and Environmental
Class Action: Putting the Substance into Class Action Procedure" (2002-03) 34 Ottawa L. Rev. 263
[McLeod-Kilmurray "Hollick"]; "Hoffman v. Monsanto: Courts, Class Actions, and Perceptions of the
Problem of GM Drift" (2007) 27 Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society 188 [McLeod-Kilmurray
"Hoffman"]; and "Stichting Greenpeace and Environmental Public Interest before the Community
Judicature: Some lessons from the Federal Court of Canada" (1998) 1 Cambridge Yb. of Eur. Legal
Studies 269 [McLeod-Kilmurray "Stichting"].
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This analysis seeks to highlight the important role of interlocutory
injunctions in Canadian environmental litigation, to uncover the judicial
assumptions and attitudes toward the environment which these decisions
reveal, and to propose a precautionary approach in the interlocutory
injunction test for use in environmental cases. In environmental
litigation, ecological realities and environmental law principles should
guide discretion, particularly in decisions which appear to be "merely
procedural" yet have significant substantive effect. The interpretation of
procedural rules in the environmental context must be undertaken from
within an environmental framework, which could include domestic and
international environmental law principles, such as the precautionary
principle. A precautionary approach would make courts more alert to the
kinds of risks that environmental harm represents, and may encourage
them to question prevailing assumptions when valuing competing interests
in particular circumstances.
Apart from often being the deciding factor in many environmental
cases, what makes interlocutory injunctions even more interesting is what
they can reveal about judicial attitudes and approaches to environmental
protection, the priority of environmental issues relative to competing
interests, and the role of courts in helping to resolve environmental
conflict.2
The case of MacMillan Bloedel v. Mullin3 is the quintessential
example 4 of the possible disparity in approaches, and how these reveal
very distinct judicial attitudes to the environment and the interests with
which it often competes. In Mullin, environmental and Aboriginal groups
5
were disputing the clearcutting of old-growth forest in Clayoquot Sound.
The judge hearing the interlocutory injunction motion held that, since
the claim to Aboriginal title had no chance of ultimate success and any
2. The closely related issue of undertakings to pay damages is crucial but beyond the scope of this
paper.: see RJR-MacDonaldlnc.v. Canada (A.G.), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311 at para. 59 [RJR Macdonald];
and Platinex Inc. v. KitchenuhmaykoosibInninuwug FirstNation,[2006] 4 C.N.L.R. 152 at paras. 113124 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J:). Future research comparing the approach to environmental pre-trial injunctions
in other institutions such as environmental tribunals, and in other jurisdictions such as the U.S.,
would be useful but has not been included here. For insights on the U.S. approach, see Stewart Elgie
"Injunctions, Ancient Forests, and Irreparable Harm: A Comment on Western Canada Wilderness
Committee v. British Columbia" (1991) 25 U.B.C.L.Rev. 387 [Elgie]; Claude Martin, "Interlocutory
Injunctions and the Environment: Comparing the Law Between Quebec and the Other Provinces"
(2004) 13 J.E.L.P. 359 at 395-97 [Martin].
3.
MacMillan BloedelLtd. v. Mullin, [1985] 2 C.N.L.R. 26 (B.C.S.C.), rev'd [1985] 3 W.W.R. 577
(B.C.C.A.) [Mullin].
4.
This is the example used in McLeod-Kilmurray, "Lowering Barriers," supra note 1.
5.
The interlocutory injunction test requires the applicant to show a serious issue to be tried, a risk
of irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favours the injunction: American Cyanamid
Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., [1975] 1 All E.R. 504 (H.L.) [Cyanamid]. See Part II below.

298

The Dalhousie Law Journal

harm to resources could be compensated by damages, there was no serious
issue. Land claims should not be allowed to hamstring the public interest
in "business as usual". This view led the court to approach the test with an
emphasis on the need for finality, and the injunction was refused, meaning
the trees could be cut before final resolution at trial.
The appeal court viewed this case as primarily about ensuring that
the trial would be able to achieve justice. It focused on the complexity
of Aboriginal rights and also on the irreplaceable nature of this globally
unique resource. The court discussed not just the legal issues, but also
analyzed the strength of the arguments on the economic issues, and openly
took into account the very political nature of this dispute. The court
therefore took a very context-specific approach to the injunctions test in
this situation, saying that "in a case such as this", since the Aboriginal
claims constituted a serious issue, it was essential to preserve the forest
until the dispute could be resolved on the full merits. It recognized that if
it failed to enjoin this logging,
[t]he forest that the Indians know and use will be permanently destroyed.
...
the Island's symbolic value will be gone. The subject matter of the trial
will have been destroyed before the rights are decided. ... The courts will
not be able to do justice in the circumstances. That is the sort of6 result
that the courts have attempted to prevent by granting injunctions .
The stark contrast between these two approaches suggests that courts would
benefit from having principles to structure their discretion in applying this
procedural tool in environmental cases. Far from being "merely procedural,"
injunction decisions have a significant effect on the substantive law, and
on the environment itself. To make pre-trial injunctions a powerful tool
of precautionary decision-making, the test must be applied through the
lens of an environmental law framework that includes the precautionary

6.
Mullin, supra note 3 at paras. 70-71 (B.C.C.A.). While this case was decided in 1985, these
issues remain highly relevant. Within Clayoquot Sound, there is recent renewal of interest in logging:
in 2006, the B.C. government announced plans to allow logging again, even though Clayoquot Sounds
has been a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve since 2000, online: <http://www.clayoquotbiosphere.org/
organization/history.php>. See generally Friends of Clayoquot Sound, online: <http://www.focs.ca/>;
and Greenpeace, online: <http://www.greenpeace.org/canada/en/press/press-releases/clayoquot-notsaved>. If there is renewed litigation over this sensitive area, a pre-trial injunction may again be the
key.
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principle.7 This would not cause courts to always favour environmental
interests, but would make them more alert to the special kinds of risks
that environmental harm represents, and may encourage them to question
prevailing assumptions. These include the idea that the government
always represents the public interest, that all harms are commensurable
and compensable with damages, and that development and economic gain
should have priority over less tangible environmental values.
This paper has two principal sections. Part I briefly sets out the test
for interlocutory injunctions, including how the test has been adapted
in particular contexts, and establishes why interlocutory injunctions are
important in environmental law. Part II then analyzes the various elements
of the test, and how they are interpreted and applied in the environmental
context. The paper concludes by arguing that environmental principles
such as precaution will assist courts in understanding the competing
positions of the parties, and in interpreting and applying the various
branches of the interlocutory injunction test in a way that accurately
reflects and enunciates the competing interests, how they are valued, and
how they have been balanced in each case.
I.

The test

1. Basic elements
Section 101 of the Ontario Courts of Justice Act provides that "[i]n the
Superior Court of Justice, an interlocutory injunction or mandatory order
may be granted ... , where it appears to a judge of the court to be just or

convenient to do so."' A similar rule exists in most common law Canadian
jurisdictions. 9 Since this general rule provides limited guidance, most
Canadian courts apply the three-part test for interlocutory injunctions
from the American Cyanamian° case of the English House of Lords, as

7. Other scholars agree that judicial perceptions and values are important in injunction decisions.
David Boyd has underlined the Mullin case as "an important turning point in judicial consideration
of environmental values" which helped overcome the "obstacle faced by public interest litigants
seeking injunctions in environmental cases," namely "judicial reasoning that betrays a profound lack
of ecological understanding." David Boyd, "Seeing the Forest Through the Trees: A Case Comment on
Algonquin Wetlands League v. Northern Bruce Peninsulaand related cases" (2000), 38 C.E.L.R. 61 at

63.
8.

R.S.O. 1990, c. C-43.

9.

Sections 18.2 and 50 of the Federal CourtsAct, R.S.C. 1985, c.F-7 and (revised) Rules 372-374

in Part 8 of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106 entitled "Preservation of Rights in Proceedings."
Stays in the Supreme Court of Canada are governed by s. 65.1 of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985,

c. S-26 and Rule 27 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156. The test for stays
is generally the same as for interlocutory injunctions: see RJR Macdonald, supra note 2; Manitoba
(A.G). v. Metropolitan Stories Ltd., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1 10 [Metro Stores].
10. Cyanamid, supra note 5.
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adopted with some modification by the Supreme Court of Canada in cases
such as Metro Stores" and RJR MacDonald.2 The three essential factors
are whether:
(i) there is a serious question to be tried;
(ii) the applicant will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is
refused;
(iii) the balance of convenience favours an injunction.
In Quebec, the interlocutory injunction provision is article 752 of the Code
of Civil Procedure:
In addition to an injunction, which he may demand by a motion to
institute proceedings, with or without other conclusions, a party may, at
the commencement of or during a suit, obtain an interlocutory injunction.
An interlocutory injunction may be granted when the applicant appears
to be entitled to it and it is considered to be necessary in order to avoid
serious or irreparable injury to him, or a factual or legal situation of such
a nature as to render the final judgment ineffectual.' 4
The first two requirements resemble the Cyanamid test, but instead
of balancing conveniences, the third branch focuses on preventing
interlocutory decisions from having final effect. As we will see, this concern
also permeates the common law caselaw. In addition, Lord Diplock in
Cyanamid itself emphasized that there will often be "special factors tobe taken into consideration in the particular circumstances of individual
cases."" 5 Indeed, legislation makes provision for altering the general test
for injunctions in some contexts.
Ontario Rule 102 makes special provision for labour injunctions,
due to the immediacy of labour disputes, their political history and the

11. Metro Stores, supranote 9.
12. RJR-MacDonald., supra note 2. Subsequent decisions have also included refinements and
exceptions to the Cyanamid test, such as Le conseil du crabe des neiges Inc. et al. v. Canada (Min.
Fisheries and Oceans) (1996), 116 F.T.R. 8 (T.D.), Richard J.
13. L.R.Q., C-25.
14. In Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Quebec (Min.of Envir.), 2003 SCC 58 at para. 20, the Court indicated the
injunction was an important part of the overall environmental protection scheme in Quebec under the
Environmental QualityAct, R.S.Q., c. Q-2: "The Superior Court is given broad powers of injunction,
to prevent or stop any act that might interfere with the fundamental right to the preservation of the
quality of the environment" (s. 19.2 EQA).
15. Cyanamid, supra note 5 at 409.
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power relations involved. 16 Roach 7 has argued that Aboriginal law is also
special enough to require its own approach to interlocutory injunctions,
due to the costs in time and money of Aboriginal litigation. Given the
connection between Aboriginal rights and the physical environment ("land
and resources"), "Aboriginal rights can often be quickly and irreparably
damaged by development such as logging, mining and hydro-electric
development."' 8 It follows that harm to the environment itself must also
merit special approaches to interlocutory relief. There is a unique role for
the courts in Aboriginal law in supervising government power because
of past abuses and continuing inequality of bargaining power. 19 The
complexity and uncertainty of these cases can only be adequately dealt
with at trial.20 Again, the parallels with environmental law are clear.2'
The importance of interlocutory injunctions in the environmental
22
context is further evidenced by the Quebec Environmental Quality Act
which creates a substantive right to environmental quality, and the method
23
provided to enforce this right is the injunction to prevent harm:

16. This is an extensive literature, including Felix Frankfurter & Nathan Greene, The Labor
Injunction (New York: MacMillan, 1930). For a brief overview, see Kent Roach, Constitutional
Remedies in Canada, looseleaf (Aurora: Canada Law Book Inc., 1994) [ConstitutionalRemedies]
and R. J. Sharpe, Injunctions and Specific Performance, looseleaf (Aurora: Canadian Law Book Inc.,
1992) [Sharpe].
17. Kent Roach, "Remedies for Violations of Aboriginal Rights" (1992) 21 Man. L.J. 498 [Roach].
18. Ibid at 501.
19. Ibid at 500.
20. Ibid at 501. He also notes that since most Aboriginal rights cases involve s. 35 of the Charter,
and its remedial purpose, the benefit of the doubt should be given to Aboriginal claimants. The nature
of Aboriginal constitutional litigation affects the test: "monetary compensation or damages is the
major remedial quest in private law litigation ... [b]y comparison, the locus on money seems almost
out of place in constitutional litigation."' Roach, supra note 17 at 506, citing H. Scott Fairley, "Private
Law Remedial Principles and the Charter: Can the Old Dog Wag His New Tail" in J. Berryman,
ed., Remedies: Issues and Perspectives (Toronto: Carswell, 1991) 313 at 326-27. See discussion of
interlocutory injunctions in constitutional cases, infra note 119 and accompanying text.
21. Roach says the irreparable harm test should be interpreted in light of the fact that "Aboriginal
interests in land should not be thought of as a commodity that readily can be compensated with
damages," and he notes the "cumulative nature of environmental degradation," which should affect
assessment of any given incident of harm. He suggests that "the assumption that damages can be used
'to restore the wilderness' strains common sense," emphasizing that compensation is not the same as
protection and prevention. "In my view a liberal approach to granting interlocutory injunctions to stop
actions which threaten Aboriginal interests is a manageable and purposive use of judicial power...
Temporary injunctions to ensure that the scope and content of Aboriginal rights are not decided by the
unilateral exercise of power are, in my view, both manageable and purposive." Ibid. at 506-07, 51617.
22. Supra note 14.
23. See generally Robert L. Rivest & Marie-Andree Thomas, "Le recours en injunction en vertu de
laLoi sur la qualit de I'environnement" in Dkveloppement' r&ents en droit de l'environnement1998
(vol. 108) (Cowansville, QC: Editions Yvon Blais, 1998) at 25.
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19.1. Every person has a right to a healthy environment and to its
protection, and to the protection of the living species inhabiting it, to the
extent provided for by this Act and the regulations, orders, approvals and
authorizations issued under any section of this Act ... 19.2. Ajudge of the
Superior Court may grant an injunction to prohibit any act or operation
which interferes or might interfere with the exercise of a right conferred
by section 19.1.24

Two pieces of Australian environmental legislation also include the
25
injunction, including the interim injunction, as a key enforcement tool.
These examples indicate that it is logical and necessary to combine
litigation for environmental protection with the procedural tool best suited
26
to the prevention of irreparable harm.
2. Aframework ofprecaution
Judges need principles to guide their discretion in interpreting rules
of procedure27-what Sharpe calls a "focus for decision-making in
interlocutory applications. ' 2 8 In the environmental context, courts should
interpret the interlocutory injunction test from within an environmental
framework. This means two things. First, courts should approach the cases
as primarily environmental cases, rather than simply procedural motions.
This would lead them to look to environmental precedent, rather than to
injunction precedents from areas of law with dissimilar contexts.
Secondly, this approach should lead courts to look to the leading
principles and priorities of environmental law to structure their.

24. Note that this right is carefully circumscribed by the words "to the extent provided for by this
Act." This statutory context is relevant in assessing caselaw under this provincial legislation. Martin
notes that this section "is similar to the injunction provided for in the Code of Civil Procedure,and
merely confirms its application to matters covered by the Environmental Quality Act," supra note 2 at
378.
25. Jo Goodie & Gary Wickham, "Calculating 'Public Interest': Common Law and the Legal
Governance of the Environment" (2002) 11Social & Legal Studies 37 at 40: "At the federal level the
World Heritage Properties Conservation Act 1983 (Cth) s. 14 [repealed in 1999, and replaced by parts
of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999] and the Ozone Protection Act
1989 (Cth) s. 56, both allow any person to initiate proceedings for an injunction to restrain a breach of
their respective Acts."
26. The Ontario Environmental Bill of Rights, 1993, S.O. c. 28 also contains a limited special
provision regarding injunctions in section 92.
27. McLeod-Kilmurray Hollick, and McLeod-Kilmurray "Lowering Barriers," supra note 1.
28. Sharpe, supra note 16 at §2.80.
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discretion.2 9 Substantive environmental law in Canada is guided by several
environmental law principles. The Canadian Environmental Protection
Act, 199930 imposes on the federal government theduty to "exercise its
powers in a manner thatprotects the environment and human health, applies
the precautionaryprinciple.., and promotes and reinforces enforceable
pollution prevention approaches." Since procedure is created to enhance
the effectiveness of substantive law, procedural rules should also be

interpreted through the lens of protection, precaution and prevention.
In particular, courts hearing requests for injunctive relief should consider
the Precautionary Principle, found in many of the newer environmental
32
statutes in Canada,3 and recognized by the Supreme Court in Spraytech.
Precaution is part of the third generation of environmental laws which
emphasize that environmental harm should be avoided, not rectified and

29. See also Australia's Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act, 1999, Act No.
91 of 1999, s. 3A "Principles of Ecologically Sustainable Development," cited in Chris Tollefson &
Jamie Thomback, "Litigating the Precautionary Principle in Domestic Courts" (2008-2009) 19 J.E.L.P.
33 [Tollefson], which includes the precautionary principle, inter-generational equity, conservation of
biodiversity and ecological integrity. I have made a similar argument for a "judicial environmental
framework" that includes many of these principles, in MeLeod-Kilmurray "Lowering Barriers"
supra note 1.See also Jerry DeMarco, "The Supreme Court of Canada's Recognition of Fundamental
Environmental Values: What Could be Next in Canadian Environmental Law?" (2007) 17 J.E.L.P.
159.
30. S.C. 1999, c. 33, s. 2(l)(a) [emphasis added].
3 1. David VanderZwaag, Susanne Fuller & Ransom Myers, "Canada and the Precautionary
Principle/Approach in Ocean and Coastal Management: Wading and Wandering in Tricky Currents"
refers to many of the instances in which
(2002-03) 34 Ottawa L. Rev. 117 at 121 [VanderZwaag et al.],
the precautionary principle has been incorporated into Canadian law: in legislation, see Canadian
Environmental Protection Act, 1999, supra note 30 at Preamble, s. 2, s. 6(1.1), and 76.1; Oceans
Act, S.C. 1996, c. 31, Preamble and s. 30; Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c.
37; Species at Risk Act, S.C. 2002, c. 29, Preamble and s. 38. In policy, see e.g. Canadian Council of
Ministers of the Environment, A Canada- Wide Accord on Environmental Harmonization (Winnipeg:
CCME Publications, 1998), online: <http://www.ccme.ca/assets/pdf/accord harmonization e.pdf>;
which "recogniz[es] such principles as polluter pays, pollution prevention, public participation and
at 124); in
Aboriginal rights, [and] expressly adopts the precautionary principle" (VanderZwaag et al.
jurisprudence see the cases highlighted in VanderZwaag. For a summary of precaution in Canadian
law, policy and jurisprudence, see generally Julie Abouchar, "Implementation of the Precautionary
Principle in Canada" in Timothy O'Riordan, James Cameron & Andrew Jordan, eds., Reinterpreting
the Precautionary Principle (London: Cameron May, 2001). See also David VanderZwaag "The
Precautionary Principle in Environmental Law and Policy: Elusive Rhetoric and First Embraces"
(1998) 8 J.E.L.P. 355.
32. 114957 Canada Ltge (Spraytech, Socigt d'arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), 2001 SCC 40 at paras.
31-32, where the Court details the principle, its sources, domestic legislation in which it is incorporated,
and academic and judicial references to it. See also Tollefson, supra note 29.
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punished after its occurrence.3" It is most often cited to Principle 15 of the
1992 Rio Declaration:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be
widely applied by States according to their capability. Where there are
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degradation.34
The Principle is particularly relevant to pre-trial injunctions for three
reasons. It is intended to apply in situations of uncertainty, i.e. where there
is risk or doubt, and it is therefore especially relevant at the pre-trial stage,
where the court is acting on an incomplete record and therefore dealing
with at least one form of uncertainty. Secondly, it has procedural impacts,
for example, on the burden and standard of proof, and it emphasizes
citizen empowerment.3 5 Finally, it challenges dominant ways of thinking:,
to change from a presumption that development or innovation are always
good. It requires us to assess risk in explicit detail, and encourages erring
on the side of caution to protect the environment. David VanderZwaag, a
world expert on precaution, specifically argues that it should be part of "a

33. In relation to the evolution of generations of environmental legislation, see Alistair R. Lucas,
"Regulatory Legislation" in Elaine L. Hughes, Alastair R. Lucas & William A. Tilleman, eds.,
Environmental Law and Policy, 3d ed. (Toronto: Edmond Montgomery Publications Limited, 2003)
at 163, 165 [HLT]. Very briefly, "[the] first generation of environmental statutes includes the basic air,
water and land pollution statutes enacted by Canada, and by the provinces in the early 1970s," while
second generation statutes address "persistent toxic substances," long-term and "intergenerational
effects," adaptability, the trans-border nature of environmental harm, and more flexible and innovative
enforcement mechanisms. See also Alistair R. Lucas, "The New Environmental Law" in R. Watts &
D. Brown, eds,. Canada, The State of the Federation: 1989 (Kingston: Queen's Univ. Institute for
lntergov. Affairs, 1990) at 168-71; and D. Paul Emond, "The Greening of Environmental Law" (1991)
36 McGill L. J. 742, who describes third generatio.n statutes as "laws to promote sustainability or
'sustainable development'," including an emphasis on public participation, prevention and "consensual
decision making."
34. Principle 15, Declaration on Environment and Development, reprinted in 31 ILM 876 (1992)
[Rio Declaration].
35. Tim O'Riordan, James Cameron & .Andrew Jordan, "The Evolution of the Precautionary
Principle" [O'Riordan et al.] in O'Riordan et al., supra note 31, 9 at 19-20: "the basic principles of the
precautionary principle are: thoughtful action in advance of scientific proofJ] ... leaving ecological
space[;]... care in management[;]... shifting the burden of proof[; and].. balancing the basis of
proportionality."
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revised approach to injunctive relief"'3 6 Claude Martin agrees: since "the
requirements as to irreparable harm and the .balance of convenience are
difficult to meet in environmental interlocutory injunctions [...] a more
liberal approach, inspired by the ideas behind the precautionary principle,
37
should be favoured in respect to these requirements.
The pre-trial injunction is both preventive and precautionary in that it
is a tool for preventing anticipated environmental harms.38 If substantive
environmental law is intended to prevent environmental harm, and requires
the application of precaution, the procedures by which this law is applied
and enforced must be preventive and precautionary too. How would this
framework affect interpretation of the injunction test in the environmental
context?
3.

The test in view of the specialfactorspresent in the environmental
context
Each element of the interlocutory injunction test itself has many sub-issues,
depending upon the substantive context. In environmental litigation, I
argue that there are four key themes relevant to interlocutory injunctions.
(1) Uncertainty:The uncertainty encountered in all pre-trial litigation
is exacerbated in environmental cases where many of the issues will
involve complex scientific questions which may not be capable of
certain resolution even after a full trial.
(2) Finality: The interlocutory injunction decision is often the final
one, because the trial will be irrelevant, since any order will be unable
to remedy environmental harm.
(3) Nature of environmental harm: When priceless natural heritage
is permanently contaminated or destroyed, there is a strong argument
that damages are not only inadequate, but also ethically inappropriate,
since nothing can substitute or compensate for such harm.
(4) Interests affected: Since preservation of property is the key feature
in environmental cases, courts should go beyond a balancing between
36. Ibid. at 394. Elsewhere, he has made similar arguments: "The precautionary principle, while still
evolving in its legal development, but suggesting the need to grant the benefit of doubt to environmental
protection rather than high risk activities, may be the creative normative wedge to rethink common
law doctrines such as nuisance and injunctive requirements," in "The Concept and Principles of
Sustainable Development: 'Rio-formulating' Common Law Doctrines and Environmental Laws"
(1993) 13 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 39 at 59. He also suggests this includes reversing burdens and
changing standards: e.g. "[o]ne may also envision a change in the injunctive standard of proof from a
'strong probability' to a reasonable possibility" at 60.
37. Martin, supranote 2 at 364.
38. Christiaan Zwart, "Environmental Injunctions" (Paper presented to the Environment Agency,
September 2006), published by 39 Street Essex Chambers, online: <http://www.39essex.co.uk/docs/
articles/CZInjunctions 140906.pdf>.
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the interests of both defendant and those of the plaintiff. The interests
of the environment itself should be central to the analysis. Also, since
environmental issues always affect the public interest, the public
interest should always be considered as part of the environmental
interlocutory injunction test.
These four themes will arise at various points in our discussion of the
interlocutory injunction test. Before turning to the test itself, however,
it is important to understand the broader implications of interlocutory
injunctions on power in the environmental context.
4. Interlocutory injunctions andpower
Interlocutory injunctions are not merely procedural motions at the
periphery of the main litigation. In many environmental cases, they are
the litigation. They have doctrinal implications, but they also significantly
affect the balance of power in environmental disputes.
Doctrinally, injunctions affect the substantive law. As Rendleman
argues, "Judges ...
enhance the protection accorded property and other
interests by deciding that damages are an inadequate remedy."3 9 Granting
an injunction, even an interlocutory one, reveals the value placed on
the protected interest: that it is important enough to prevent harm to it,
rather than merely compensating for such harm. On a more practical
level, an important role of injunctions is to alter the power relations in
environmental disputes. By refusing to enjoin environmentally harmful
activities, the court may be maintaining power where it lies, and refusing
to level the playing field for all interests in the environmental debate.4 °
By granting injunctions to protect the environment in the interim, courts
can balance the negotiating power of the competing sides by allowing all
voices to be heard, and giving them time to make the best case possible.
This is important, because power is often very unevenly distributed in
cases involving environmental disputes. Amy Sinden4 has argued:
Environmental disputes involve asymmetries of power ...
On one side,
[they] commonly involve an interest that is broadly shared among
individuals, non-economic in character, and often of relatively minor
consequence to each one. ..-.
On the other side, the interests pitted against
the set of diffuse public interests are of a very different character. First,
39. D. Rendleman, "The Inadequate Remedy at Law Prerequisite for an Injunction" (1981) 33 U.
Fla. L. Rev. 346 at 350.
40. Although some of the larger and older environmental groups such as Greenpeace may have
significant power, many environmental advocates are "out muscled," financially and politically, by
competing interests.
41. Amy Sinden "In Defence of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in Environmental Law"
(2004-05) 90 Iowa L. Rev. 1405.
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they are usually held by a much smaller set of actors. Second, they tend
to be economic in character and have the potential to directly impact
each individual actor to a far larger degree. And third, the actors are
typically businesses and corporations, rather than individuals.42

This means environmental interests are harder to organize and have less
clout than corporations who are wealthier and more influential politically:
"As a result, environmental disputes almost always involve an asymmetry
of power that weighs against environmental protection."43
This power imbalance is clearly demonstrated in interlocutory
injunctions. Even though we are here concerned primarily with interlocutory
injunctions seeking to protect environmental resources, it is useful to
briefly compare the readiness with which the courts grant injunctions to
44
quell environmental protest in cases of natural resource exploitation.
This contrast is a further indication of the judicial inclination to protect
private property, as well as development goals (of both the private and
public sectors), above other interests such as environmental protection.
The Clayoquot Sound clearcutting example discussed above highlights
this other side of the issue of power in pre-trial injunction cases. MacMillan
Bloedel obtained interlocutory injunctions to stop the protestors obstructing
their logging operations on Vancouver Island between 1985 and 1996.
In response to the 1993 provincial government's Clayoquot Land Use

42. Ibid. at 1436-37.
43. Ibid. at 1438-39. Speaking in the context of regulatory action, Sinden argues for absolute
standards, and against the crude balancing of cost-benefit analysis. Absolute standards "replac[e] the
usual utilitarian balancing of interests with a trumping approach [in which] a right operates as a blunt
prophylactic rule that puts a heavy thumb on the scale in favour of the weaker interest. ... Under such
an environmental trumping approach, environmental protection interests outweigh countervailing
interests of economic cost, except in extraordinary circumstances." She refers to other scholars who
agree this should also apply in the case of injunctions, specifically due to this power imbalance: Ibid.
at 1484-85. Footnote 351 provides: "Cass Sunstein ...
argues that in cases involving environmental
harm, courts should reject the usual common law balancing-of-equities approach to injunctive relief
and the presumption in favor of damages and instead adopt a presumption favoring injunctive relief.
This is because '[i]n the environmental arena ...there is a severe collective action problem, and
environmental harms that are trivial in the individual case might be collectively disastrous."' Sinden
herself uses the example that the strong standards in the U.S. EndangeredSpecies Act led to many
"injunctions under it ...
against politically powerful and influential industries," at 1493. The cases are
listed in her footnote 384.
44. E.g. Ridge Landfill Corporation Ltd. v. Jacobs et al. (1981), 10 C.E.L.R. 125 (S.C. Ont.), Siska
Indian Bandy. B.C. (Min.Forests), [1999] B.C.J. No. 2354, among many others.
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Decision,4 5 thousands of protestors blocked MacMillan Bloedel logging
trucks in defiance of the injunction. Nine hundred were arrested and eight
hundred and sixty convicted of criminal 46 contempt, with most serving jail
sentences. 47 The multiple trials and sentence hearings became known as
48
the "Clayoquot mass trials.
While a full discussion of the courts' use of criminal contempt in
such situations is beyond the scope of this paper, what is interesting is
the degree to which environmental issues were almost completely excised
from these injunction decisions. Julia Lawn 49 points out that the issue was
reduced to maintaining respect for the courts while the environmental
substance of the disputes became irrelevant. The Supreme Court defined
the case as a battle of private property and contractual rights against "the
right to express public dissent,"5 ° without mention of the environmental
resources at stake. The courts' perception of the paramountcy of private
property rights and the court's role in law enforcement carried the day.
In coming to its decision, the court apparently failed to appreciate that
the competing interest was actually the public interest in protection of

45. B.C. government, April 13, 1993. "Weeks before the provincial government announced its April
1993 decision to allow logging in 74 percent of the Clayoquot's ancient forest, [it] invested $50 million
into the company, becoming the largest shareholder," in Ron Maclsaac & Anne Champagne, eds.,
Clayoquot Mass Trials: Defending the Rainforest (Gabriola Island, B.C.: New Society Publishers,
1994) at 14. Ingram notes that this coloured the perception of the public as to the appropriateness of
the courts enforcing these government tree licences and of the provincial attorney general being asked
by the courts to proceed with these contempt cases on a criminal basis. Gordon Brent Ingram, "The
Ecology of a Conflict" in T. Berman et al., eds., Clayoquot & Dissent (Vancouver: Ronsdale, 1994) 9
at 11.
46. When the injunctions were ignored, they began to be enforced by criminal contempt. The B.C.
attorney general had a policy (see MacMillan Bloedel v. Simpson, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 1048, 22 C.E.L.R.
(N.S.) 1) of not interfering with the public protests by means of arresting people under the Criminal
Code. MacMillan Bloedel therefore asked that the proceedings be pursued as criminal rather than civil
contempt. The Court specifically asked the attorney general of B.C. to undertake management of these
cases, and the penalties included fines as well as prison sentences.
47. See e.g., MacMillan Bloedel v. Brown (1994), 92 B.C.L.R. (2d) I (B.C.C.A.), among many
others.
48. See Maclsaac and Champagne, supra note 45 and Berman et al., supra note 45. In 1985, the
trial court in Mullin, supra note 3, which refused the interlocutory injunction to stop the logging, also
granted an injunction to stop the protests. A similar result obtained in McLeod Lake Indian Band v.
British Cohmbia, [1989] 4 C.N.L.R. 83 (B.C.S.C.).
49. Julia E. Lawn, "The John Doe Injunction in Mass Protest Cases" (1998) 56 U. T. Fac. Law Rev.
101.
50. Supra note 46 at 10.
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property, and the shared interest in environmental resources, particularly
when such resources are globally unique and irreplaceable.5
* Had the courts approached this from within a precautionary framework,
it may have led them to be more specific in characterizing the content of the
protest, its purposes, and whether it was in the public interest.52 It might also
have caused the courts to cease enforcing the equitable injunction remedy
given that after several years, MacMillan Bloedel had not proceeded with
the trial on the merits. 3 The Court's conclusion that it was a fair balancing
of the competing interests to allow protest to continue, but only without
interfering with private property rights, ignored the emptiness of rights
such as freedom of expression in the environmental context when the right
to protest excludes the right to actually prevent permanent and irreparable
harm to globally unique resources. The Supreme Court did not mention
51. A contrasting approach can be found in MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Western Canadian Wilderness
Committee (1988), 4 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 110 (B.C.S.C.) where the court refused to enjoin the defendant
public interest group from "building a hiking trail" through the area where MacMillan Bloedel held
a Tree Farm Licence, since the licence did not entitle the company to exclusive possession of all the
land within the licence area, and therefore no serious issue was raised. It also held the balance of
convenience favoured the environmental advocates, because "I have no doubt that monetary damages
would adequately compensate the plaintiff Company" [emphasis added]. The judge pointed out that
what MacMillan Bloedel really feared was that the trail "will encourage sufficient support for their
cause to persuade the Minister to cancel that portion of Tree Farm Licence Number 44," and he
held that if this did occur, "the plaintiff presumably would be bound to look to the Crown and not to
individual citizens for such relief as may be available."
52. The court cited other protest cases, such as against abortion clinics, Ontario (A.G.) v. Dieleman
(1994), 20 O.R. (3d) 229 (Gen. Div.). The strong moral and emotion context of these issues cause
some to argue that they are best resolved politically. Yet courts have been granted the injunctive power,
and it is a vital step in long-term disputes. Courts will either interfere or not interfere, and the point is
that refusing an injunction is just as "activist" as granting one. Rather than claiming to remain neutral
by upholding the government's policy decisions, the courts must look at the practical effect that their
decisions will have on ongoing disputes, and this requires looking at the competing interests in the
substantive context, particularly any effects that will be irreparable.
53. Despite noting that "MacMillan Bloedel has not brought the main action on for trial. Its counsel
did not suggest that it ever would," the Supreme Court held: "MacMillan Bloedel was entitled to
claim against them such relief as the law allows. Although it contented itself with obtaining interim
injunctions, MacMillan Bloedel could have proceeded to trial to obtain permanent injunctions and
damages against them. The fact that they chose not to pursue the fullest remedy available is not a basis
for denying it any other relief allowed by law." MacMillan Bloedel, supra note 46 at paras. 9, 16-17.
Yet those sympathetic to the protesters have argued that "[t]he company was using the injunction as
a means of avoiding the difficulties of a civil trial, a trial in which it would have had to defend its
logging practices. Hence, for the courts to extend and re-extend the original injunction meant that
they were aiding MacMillan Bloedel to circumvent the appropriate legal process. ... In effect, the
courts were creating a private criminal law for MacMillan Bloedel. ... Not only that, but the use of an
injunction creates a situation which pits the judiciary against its citizens instead of the Plaintiff against
the Defendant." Ronald B. Hatch, "The Clayoquot Show Trials" in Berman et al., supranote 45, 105 at
137. Also, interlocutory injunctions are equitable remedies, and MacMillan Bloedel could have been
argued not to have clean hands. See Maclsaac et al., supra note 45 at 70-71, listing 23 convictions
against the company for violations of various environmental laws. In addition, if the trial is never
brought, the injunctions become defacto permanent injunctions, without benefit of trial.
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the final effect doctrine, and framed its decision so as to provide a general
precedent for protest cases and for proxy orders a.k.a. Jane and John
Doe orders,54 which are abstracted from the realities of the environmental
context.55
This trend has largely continued into the very recent caselaw,16 with
few exceptions.57 The Eagleridge Bluffs coalition posted a letter 8 for
supporters to sign when interlocutory injunctions were granted to stop
protests of the Sea to Sky Highway for the 2010 Olympics. It highlighted
the group's concerns and. what they felt was a misapplication of the
interlocutory injunction test:
Iam deeply concerned over the continued use of civil injunctions.., by the
Courts of British Columbia as a means of upholding the financial rights
of private corporations in land disputes, while stifling public concern
54. Joe and Jane Doe orders are court "orders against unidentified persons not named in the action
or named only in proxy as 'Jane Doe' and 'John Doe': MacMillan Bloedel, supra note 46 at para. I.
55. This approach of divorcing the issue from its context was seen with greater clarity in Slocan
Forest Products Ltd v. Valhalla Wilderness Society (1998), 28 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 88 at paras. 22-23
(B.C.S.C.): "The balancing of convenience that was under consideration.., is not one between the
plaintiff as one lawful resource user and Mr. Anderson as another lawful resource user in conflict... It
was a balancing of convenience between a plaintiff with the legal right to construct, use and maintain a
public road ...
and harvest timber on one hand, and a crowd of persons who resorted to illegal use of a
blockade to impede that legal right, on the other. The virtue of this cause and the objective correctness
of their values are all completely irrelevant because the rule of law in our democracy requires that
rights are established and adjudicated by due process, not by force." This was recently followed in Red
Chris Development v. Quock, 2006 BCSC 1472.
56. Interlocutory injunctions against environmental protesters have been granted in many recent
cases. In Hamilton v. Loucks (2003), 232 D.L.R. (41h) 362 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); John Voortman & Assoc.
Ltd. v.Haudenosaunee Confederacy Chiefs Council, [2009] O.J. No. 1350 (Sup. Ct. J.); Frontenac
Ventures Corp. v.Ardoch Algonquin First Nation (2008), 165 A.C.W.S. (3d) 155 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)
(uranium exploration on disputed Aboriginal land); Platinex Inc. v. Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug
First Nation (2007), 29 C.E.L.R. (3d) 460 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (test drilling on claimed traditional lands
without appropriate consultation); Eagleridge Bluffs & Wetlands Preservation Society v. B.C. (Ministry
of Transportation), 2006 BCSC 815 and related actions (protesters interfering with construction of Sea
to Sky Highway in preparation for the Vancouver Olympics).
57. Interlocutory injunctions against environmental protestors have also been refused in a few cases.
In Platinex Inc. v. Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug First Nation (2006), 272 D.L.R. (4th) 727 (Ont.
Sup. Ct. J.) by the Aboriginal plaintiffs to enjoin the test drilling on their property, and also by the
company to enjoin the protests. Justice G.P. Smith who later permitted the drilling and enjoined the
protests, held at this earlier stage of this case that the evidence showed the Aboriginal plaintiffs would
suffer irreparable harm if the mining proceeded before adequate consultation and that the balance of
convenience favoured the preservation of the land pending trial. The Court cited Sonia Lawrence &
Patrick Macklem, "From Consultation to Reconciliation: Aboriginal Rights and the Crown's Duty
to Consult" (2000) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 253 at 275: "[w]ith respect to cases involving a breach of the
Crown's duty to consult, however, judicial reluctance to grant interlocutory injunctions creates a
perverse incentive on the Crown to engage in ineffective consultations with a First Nation." See also
Henco Industries Ltd. v. Haudenosaunee Six Nations Confederacy Council (2006), 277 D.L.R. (4"')
274 (Ont. C.A.).
58. Eagleridge Bluffs Coalition, letter to the B.C. Justice Review Task Force, the premier and the
provincial Attorney General.
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over the irreparable harm being done to the environment at the hand of
our government. BC is one of the few jurisdictions where injunctions
are used routinely to control public protest over government sanctioned
environmental destruction. ... The Supreme Court of BC has recognized
many times over that injunctions are powerful tools that should only be
used as a last resort when other statutory remedies have failed. Why then
does injunctive relief continue to be granted as a first line of defence
against protesters when statutory measures have NOT been attempted
and public safety is NOT threatened? And why does 'irreparable harm'
only pertain to the potential financial loss of a corporation and not to the
imminent destruction of irreplaceable ecosystems? 9
Yet this is not the only approach available to the courts. In MacMillan
Bloedel v Brown, Mr. Justice Lambert in dissent outlined the developments
in the multi-year protest against clearcutting. 60 He recognized that the goal
of the protesters was not to discredit the courts, but was politically directed
at the Clayoquot Sound Land Use Decision. 6' He drew out the question of
what role the .courts are playing when they uphold government policy:
[I]t is important to ask to what extent the authority of the courts may be
thought to be depreciated by these acts of protest in an overall context
where ...the courts find themselves the instruments for upholding the
Clayoquot Sound Land Use Decision which, according to the Provincial
Ombudsman, was made without consulting the Nuu-chah-nulth peoples
whose constitutionally protected aboriginal rights may be deeply affected
by the Decision and who may themselves have been denied
the protection
62
of the rule of law as it relates to administrative fairness.
These disputes and injunction decisions show how injunctions significantly
affect power relations in environmental disputes. They also highlight how
often the courts do not even appear to turn their minds to the environmental
context of these decisions.
Having highlighted the importance of understanding the relationships
of power and the underlying presumptions in the environmental context,
the following Part will examine in more detail the various elements of the
test for an interlocutory injunction, using particular cases as examples of
the variety of approaches in environmental disputes. They will demonstrate
the underlying ethics dominating these decisions, and how a precautionary
framework may have altered the approach to this procedural tool.

59. It is important to note that these protesters, as the letter clarifies, felt that the courts should stay
out of these issues and "[i]t is the duty of the government, not the courts, to find an acceptable balance
between economic growth and environmental sustainability."
60. MacMillan Bloedel v. Brown, supra note 47 at para 102.
61. Ibid. atpara. 126.
62. Ibid. at para. 127.
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II. Analyzing the elements of the test
1. Serious issue

The first aspect of the test requires the court to determine whether there
is a serious issue to be tried. This is not the main barrier to environmental
advocates, as the threshold is quite low. 63 However, there are several
interesting aspects to this first branch of the test, which make its analysis
rewarding. Firstly, the manner in which a judge selects and defines what
the main issue is tends to determine the outcome of the injunction decision
and, more relevant for our purposes, it is particularly revealing of the court's
attitudes and priorities. Mullin64 again provides a good example. The trial
judge in Mullin perceived the dispute to be about whether Aboriginal
land claims should be allowed to hold up the forestry industry and the
provincial economy indefinitely. Resolved that this should be prevented,
he focused on those aspects of the injunction test that would permit him
to refuse this interim remedy, namely the purported lack of a primafacie
case. The Court of Appeal focused on the complexity of the issues, and
what could not be remedied at trial-harm to the unique ancient growth
forests. It therefore focused on the irreparable harm branch of the test,
and the final effect test. Thus, how the court defines the issue depends
on judicial perceptions, and directly influences the application of the test.

Yet even within this fairly straightforward branch of the test, there remain
some points of contention.
Although a serious issue is the standard test in most environmental
litigation, 65 the question still arises as to whether the higher threshold of

63. See RJR MacDonald,supra note 2 at para. 44.
64. Mullin, supra note 3.
65. The test is alternately phrased as "serious question" or "serious issue": Mullin, supra note 3;
Kitkatla Bank v. British Columbia (Ministerof Forests), [1998] B.C.J. No. 2667 (B.C.S.C.); Friends
of Point Pleasant Park v. Canada (A.G.) (2000), 38 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 45 (F.C.T.D.); Cape Breton
Landowners v. Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags Aktiebolag (1982), 11 C.E.L.R. 141 (interlocutory
injunction) [Palmer];Friends of the West Country Association v. Canada (Minister of Fisheriesand
Oceans) (1998), 234 N.R. 96 (F.C.A.) (stay decision). See final decision in overall case at (1999),
31 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 239 (F.C.A.); Township of Essa v. Atomic Energy Control Board, et al. and
Township of Tosorontio v. Atomic Energy Control Boardet al. (1981), 10 C.E.L.R. 142 (F.CT.D.) at
145 [Tosorontio v. Atomic]; Township of Tosorontio v. Scarborough (1981), 10 C.E.L.R. 146 (F.C.A.)
at 147; Waste Not Wanted Inc. v. The Queen in Right of Canada,The Minister of Energy Mines and
Resources andAtomic Energy of CanadaLimited (1984), 13 C.E.L.R. 100 at 103 [Waste not Wanted];
"fair question": MacMillan Bloedel v. WCWC, [1988] B.C.J. No. 2510 (B.C.S.C.); Wheatley v. Ellis,
[1944] 3 W.W.R 462 (B.C.C.A.); Attorney General of British Columbia v. Wale et. al, [1987] 2
C.N.L.R. 36, [Wale], aff'd [1991] 1 S.C.R. 62; Friends of Stanley Park v. Vancouver (City) Board
of Parks and Recreation (2000), 10 M.P.L.R. (3d) 25 (B.C.S.C.); "substantial issue": Ridge Landfill
Corp. Ltd. v.Jacobs (1981), 10 C.E.L.R. 125 (Ont. S.C.); "arguable case" Northwood Inc. v. B.C.
(Forest PracticesBoard) (1999), 32 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 167 (B.C.C.A.) (equate serious issue with an
arguable case).
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a primafacie case should be required. Prior to Cyanamid, the basic test
required the plaintiff first to demonstrate a primafacie case. This was a
very high hurdle and a practice was evolving to use this pre-trial hearing
as a quick and less expensive test of the merits, which frequently led to
settlement.66 This changed in Cyanamid, a patent case involving a new
type of surgical sutures, whose complex scientific facts made the likely
outcome particularly difficult to predict. The Court lowered the first branch
of the test to merely require evidence of a serious question,
i.e., one that
was not frivolous or vexatious.
67
Sharpe sets out six exceptions to the current "serious question" test.
It is often held that the higher primafacie test is more appropriate where:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

it cannot be determined where the balance of convenience lies;
the facts are not in dispute;
the case turns on a pure question of law;
particular substantive issues are involved, such as defamation;
the injunction is sought against a public entity; or
the rights of the parties are finally determined on the interlocutory
motion.

Of these, the last two are particularly relevant to the environmental
situation. 68 First, however, it is useful to address the overarching issue
of scientific complexity, because this was the primary driving force for
lowering the threshold in Cyanamid. Does the context of environmental
law also justify a lower threshold, due to the usual scientific complexity of
the issues involved?

66. See generally Sharpe supra note 16, and John Leubsdorf, "The Standard for Preliminary
Injunctions" (1978) 91 Harv. Law Rev. 525 [Leubsdorfj.
67. Sharpe, supra note 16 at paras. 2.300 to 2.380.
68. The first situation is not an exception, since it elaborates the Cyanamidtest itself, which states
that if having considered all factors including irreparable harm and balance of convenience, the risk to
both sides is equal, the court can then look to the relative strength of the parties' cases, but this should
only be influential where one side is clearly stronger. The second two exceptions are based on the
reduced risk of error where the facts are not in dispute or the issue is a question of law-the motions
judge is then as well placed as the trial court to decide. The fourth exception is again not an exception,
and is often because some element of the logic of the interlocutory injunction is lacking: for instance,
Sharpe, supra note 16 indicates that the primafacie test applies intrade mark cases, or cases where
the injunction seeks to compel medical procedures, because the injunction will have final effect, at
para. 2.356. In patent cases, where the defendant undertakes to account, damages must be an adequate
remedy since they can be repaired by means of the accounting, ibid. In cases enforcing negative
covenants, in Canada (A. G.) v. Saskatchewan Water Corp. et al. (1991), 5 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 252 (Sask.
Q.B.), rev'd [1992) 4 W.W.R. 712 (Sask. C.A.), addt'l reasons [1993] 7 W.W.R. I (Sask C.A.) [Sask.
Water Corp.], the strength of the plaintiff's case was held to be the main issue, and if the case is very
strong, irreparable harm and balance of convenience are much less relevant.
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One of the decisive elements in Cyanamidwasthe scientific complexity
of the patent issue. This led Lord Diplock to emphasize the dangers of
reaching conclusions on the merits at the interlocutory stage, and led the
court to create the new lower threshold test.6 9 Scientific complexity is
central in many environmental cases, yet is treated differently by various
courts.
Some courts take the view that uncertainty means there is no proof of
irreparable harm, so no interim injunction should issue.70 Others find that the
uncertainty should not prevent a decision on the interlocutory injunction,
and move on to other factors in the test.7' Another approach is to say that
where there is uncertainty, it is best to maintain the status quo until trial,
although, as we will see below in discussing the balance of convenience,
much depends on how the status quo is defined. Where government is
involved, some courts defer to its view of the science,73 although some
consider the plaintiff's scientific evidence and prefer it.7" Finally, some try
to resolve the uncertainty where they feel this is necessary, such as when
,the decision will have final effect.
A precautionary approach would lead courts to find that where there
is uncertainty, it is best to err on the side of environmental protection until
it is proved that the proposed course of action will not cause harm.75 (It is
important to note that this can mean granting or refusing the injunction,
depending on the facts.) There are cases demonstrating this precautionary
approach. Palmer,7 6 where a government-licenced forest company was
enjoined from aerially spraying pesticide until objections by local residents
and Aboriginal people could be heard, clearly supports this notion.77
Although the motions judge lamented that scientifically complex issues
are not for courts to finally determine, he held that courts retain a limited
but important institutional role in such cases. He reversed the burden,
enjoining the spraying until those using the pesticides could prove they

69. Cyanamid, supra note 5 at 509-510.
70. Edwards v. Canada (Minister of Agriculture) (1992), 8 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 81 (F.C.T.D.) and
Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society v. Superintendent of Banff National Park and Sunshine
Village Corporation (1993), 23 Admin. L.R. (2d) 6 (F.C.T.D.) [CPAWS].
71. Village of Kannata Valley et al. v. Kannata Highlands Ltd. (1983), 13 C.E.L.R. I (Sask. Q.B.)
[Village of Kannata].
72. Palmer, supra note 65; Tosorontio v.Atomic, supra note 65; Waste Not Wanted, supra note 65.
73. Edwards, supra note 70; CPA WS, supra note 70.
74. Friends of Point Pleasant Park, supra note 65.
75. See Bolton et al. v. Forest Pest Management Institute, et al. (1985), 14 C.E.L.R. 63 (B.C.C.A.)
[Bolton], and Palmer, supra note 65.
76. Palmer, supra note 65.
77. Although this case predates the popularity of precaution as an environmental law principle and
does not explicitly use the term.
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were safe.78 Thus, scientific complexity militates in favour of precaution,
and in favour of the lower serious question threshold in environmental
cases, as it did in Cyanamid. Should environmental cases involving the
Sharpe factors of final effect or public entities revert to the higher prima
facie test?
Another situation where courts often require the higher threshold of a
primafacie case is where the interlocutory injunction decision will have
final effect. The logic is that since there will be no further litigation, the
matter is in essence no longer interlocutory, 9 so the merits should govern. 80
Yet the final effect doctrine provides a compelling example of the centrality
of substantive context in evaluating procedural tests. While in many
cases granting an injunction will have final effect, in the environmental
context, most injunctions will only have final effect if the environment
is not protected. 8' By contrast, where the competing interest is logging or
development, the defendant's interests will simply be delayed. Due to the
risks of deciding the merits at the interlocutory stage, and the complexity
of environmental decisions, this is exactly the kind of situation in which
a precautionary approach is called for. Most of these cases should not be
decided until the full merits have been heard at trial, and the resources
should be protected until then. Indeed, one of the central elements of the
interlocutory injunction test in the Code de Proc&dureCivile of Quebec is
82
ensuring that the final judgment in the case can be effective.
78. See Lynda Collins, "Strange Bedfellows? The Precautionary Principle and Toxic Tort: A Tort
Paradigm for the 21st Century" (2005) 35 Envtl. L. Rep. 10361: "Because tort traditionally allocates
the burden of proof to the person seeking to change the status quo, James M. Olson asserts that tort
should redefine the status quo from an ecological perspective. Thus, rather than viewing the status
quo as a state of human conduct, e.g., the discharge of airborne contaminants, the status quo should
be defined as an unpolluted or less-polluted environment, e.g., clean air. Since it is the toxic defendant
who seeks to change, or has already changed, the status quo, the burden should be on her to prove
that the change is or was justified," citing James M. Olson, "Shifting the Burden of Proof: How the
Common Law Can Safeguard Nature and Promote an Earth Ethic" (1990) 20 Envtl. Law 891 at 894
[Olson].
79. Sharpe, supra note 16 at 2.340, 2.350 and 2.380.
80. Lord Diplock himself created this exception in N.WL. Ltd v. Woods, [1979] 3 All E.R. 614
(H.L.), saying that where the interlocutory injunction is likely to have final effect "because the harm
that will have been already caused to the losing party by its grant or its refusal is complete and of a
kind for which money cannot constitute any worthwhile recompense" (at 626), the court should assess
the strength of the plaintiff's case as "a factor to be brought into the balance by the judge in weighing
the risks that injustice may result from his deciding the application one way rather than another." See
also W. Sofronoff, "Interlocutory Injunction Having Final Effect" (1987) 61 Aust. L.J. 341 at 347,
citing Eveleigh L.J. in Cayne v. Global Natural Resources Plc., [1984] 1All E.R. 225; P. Carlson, in
"Granting an Interlocutory Injunction: What is the Test?" (1982) 12 Man. L. J. 109; and Leubsdorf
supra note 66 at 545-6, 557, 565.
81. Elgie, supra note 2, agrees that where an interlocutory injunctionfails to protect an environmental
resource, it will always have final effect.
82. Supra note 13.
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In cases where the environment has been protected at the interlocutory
stage, the courts emphasize the "final effect" factor. For example, in the
Palmer pesticide case, the fact that refusing the injunction would have final
effect was "the determining consideration"83 in granting it. As in Mullin, 4
the court in Baker Lake also emphasized finality: "The minerals, if there,
will remain; the caribou, presently there, may not."85
The argument becomes even clearer by examining of cases applying
the final effect test incorrectly. In litigation over the Rafferty Alameda dam,
the federal government sought to enjoin continued provincial development
of the dam until the federal Environmental Assessment Board had reported
on the project. The court held that where interlocutory injunctions have
final effect, the threshold is raised from a serious question to aprimafacie
case:
it seems clear that if no interlocutory injunction is granted and no
other legal or other impediment arises which might interfere with
the construction of the Project, then the Project will be substantially
completed by the fall of 1991. It seems obvious that upon substantial
completion of the Project, there would no longer be any purpose in
holding a trial. Consequently, the refusal of an interlocutory injunction
in this case would, in my view, have the practical effect of putting an end
to the action. It86is, therefore, my view that the plaintiff must meet the

primafacie test.

However here, the federal government as plaintiff was seeking an
interlocutory injunction which would stop construction and would
therefore preserve the purpose of holding a trial. If anybody should have
had to show aprimafaciecase, it was the defendants who wanted to put an
end to the action by asking the court to refuse the interlocutory injunction.
Final effect is therefore not a reason to raise the burden on those seeking to
protect the environment. Should the burden be raised when the respondent
is a public entity?
Courts often defer to governmental activity, particularly in fields such
as environmental law that are seen as polycentric, policy-based, resourceallocation decisions which the legislature and executive are institutionally
better equipped to deal with.87 Further, the assumption that the government
83. Palmer,supra note 65 at para. 20.
84. Mullin, supra note 3 at paras. 69-70.
85. Baker Lake v. Canada (MinisterDIAND), [1979] 1 F.C. 487 at para. 11 (T.D.).
86. Saskatchewan Water Corp., supra note 68 at 271-72.
87. See H. McLeod-Kilmurray "Placing and Displacing Science: Science and the Gates of Judicial
Power in Environmental Cases" (2009) U. Ottawa Law & Tech. J. (forthcoming); Lynda M. Collins,
"Tort, Democracy and Environmental Governance: The Case of Non-Enforcement" (2007) Tort L.
Rev. 107.
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represents the public interest is influential, 8 including in environmental
cases. 9 For example, the courts have often said that "[w]hen a public
authority is prevented from exercising its statutory powers, it can be said
that the public interest, of which that authority is the guardian, suffers
irreparable harm." 90 However, many environmental plaintiffs claim to
be representing the public interest, frequently against the government,
such as when government funds and licences projects that can negatively
impact the environment. It cannot be presumed to be the sole voice of the
environmental public interest, if such a single public interest exists.
There are conflicting approaches to this issue in the jurisprudence.
Some courts defer to the government, while others carefully state and
consider the competing public interests in the case. 9' My argument is
that determining, rather than assuming, where the public inteirest lies is
the better approach, and that the presence of a public entity alone should
not justify a higher threshold question for the opposing party. Further, as
Sinden 92 and others have argued, environmental public interest litigants
are often small local groups lacking the expertise and financial resources

88. John N. Ahem argues in "Interlocutory Injunctions in Administrative Law: What is the Test?"
(1992) 5 Can. J.Admin. L. & Prac. 1 at 27-30, 48, that "[w]here an interlocutory injunction is sought
against a public authority, the public authority is deemed to act lawfully until the applicant proves
otherwise. The granting of an interlocutory injunction in these circumstances is rebuttably presumed
to result in irreparable harm to the public interest" (at 48). He also states that "[t]he fact that alleged
irreparable harm is not measurable in money damages has also been weighed in the balance of
convenience. ... [T]his factor will generally favour the public authority because the authority often
represents the interests of a large segment of the general public. Thus, harm to such a large group,
whether it be incurred by granting or denying an injunction, is likely to be unquantifiable" (at 49).
Does this suggest that where a non-government party such as an ENGO represents the public interest,
it should also benefit from such an assumption? Does it mean that in class actions, irreparable harm
should be presumed because of the numbers involved?
89. See e.g., Edwards and CPA WS, supra note 70.
90. Canada (Attorney General) v. Fishing Vessel Owners 'Assn. (British Columbia), [19851 I F.C.
791 (C.A.), as recently cited in North of Smokey Fishermans Assn. v.Canada (Attorney General),
2003 FCT 33 at paras. 22-23, where the court found the evidence on long-term fish stock health
"speculative," and held the importance of not interfering with government action was paramount,
even though the plaintiffs argued that "if the injunction is not granted, success on the judicial review
will be hollow if the offshore fleet has already fished its quota. This may push stocks beyond the point
where recovery is not likely and the short-term interests of the offshore fleet will have been realized
at the long-term expense of the ecosystem, the fish stocks and other sectors of the fishing industry. If,
on the other hand, the injunction is granted and the 2003 stock status reports prove NOSFA wrong, the
offshore fleet will merely be delayed in catching its quota."
91. See e.g. Bolton, supra note 75.
92. Supra note 41.
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to battle government or large developers.93 These plaintiffs particularly
should not have to meet the higher primafacie case burden at this early
stage of litigation.
In summary, a precautionary approach would lead the courts to
presume that the test to be applied at the first stage of the injunctions test
in environmental cases is the lower threshold of a serious issue. However,
the serious issue/primafacie case debate reveals how the courts see the
issues and upon which party they place the greater burden. It also reveals
whether they apply the various factors with the finesse that a contextual
approach demands. Similar questions arise in relation to the next branch
of the test: irreparable harm.
2. Irreparableharm

The second branch of the interlocutory injunction test is the irreparable
harm factor. This is the heart of the interlocutory injunction test in
environmental cases. Where the harm being risked cannot be repaired,
precaution is essential. There are four issues to be discussed in relation
to this factor: (i) the definition of the term "irreparable"; (ii) applying
this test when the subject matter of litigation is property; (iii) degrees of
irreparability, and (iv) whose irreparable harm is to be considered.
Definition

The meaning of "irreparable" is different at the interlocutory and trial
stages. The only relevant irreparable harm at the interlocutory stage is
harm that cannot be remedied by the final outcome of the trial, whether
these are damages or a permanent injunction: 94
'Irreparable' refers to the nature of the harm suffered rather than its
magnitude. It is harm which either cannot be quantified in monetary
terms or which cannot be cured, usually because one party cannot collect

93. Angus et al. v. Canada (1990), 4 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 274 (F.C.T.D.); Algonquin Wildlands League v.
Ontario (Minister of Natural Resources) (1996), 21 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 102 (Ont. Div. Ct.); Bolton, supra
note 75; Caddy Lake Cottagers Assn. v. Florence-Nora Access Road Inc. (1998), 26 C.E.L.R. (N.S.)
322 (Man. C.A.); Canada (AG.) v. Saskatchewan Water Corporation et al. (1990), 5 C.E.L.R. (N.S.)
252 (Sask. Q.B.); Canada (AG.) v. Saskatchewan Water Corporation, [1992] 4 W.W.R. 712 (Sask.
C.A.); Canada (A.G.) v. Saskatchewan Water Corporation, [1993] 7 W.W.R. I (Sask. C.A.); CPAWS,
supra note 70; Edwards, supra note 70; Friends ofPoint Pleasant, supra note 65; Friends of the West
Country, supra note 65; Int'l Fund for Animal Welfare, supra note 60; Mullin, supra note 2; WCWC,
Palmer, and Ridge Landfill, supra note 65; Red Mountain Residents and Property Owners Assoc.
v. British Columbia (Ministry of Forests, British Columbia Forest Service, Arrow Forest District)
(2000), 35 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 127 (B.C.S.C.); Tosorontio v. Atomic and Waste Not Wanted, supra note 66;
Hllage of Kannata, supra note 71.
94. Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1991) at 113; Sharpe, supra note 16 at 2.390; Paul Perell, "The Interlocutory Injunction and
Irreparable Harm" (1989) 68 Can. Bar Rev. 538 at 548 [Perell].
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damages from the other. Examples of the former include instances where
one party will be put out of business by the court's decision ... or where a
permanentloss ofnaturalresources will be the result where a challenged
activity is not enjoined.95

It is significant that in the very task of defining irreparable harm in a
case involving the Charter right to freedom of commercial expression,
the Court turned to the environment as a prime example. Laycock cites
environmental law as one of the substantive areas "where all injury is
irreparable. ' 96 Environmental harm cannot be fully quantified financially.
Even if trees can be replanted or lakes cleaned, the environments are
never truly or fully restored, and therefore most environmental harm is
permanent and irreparable. 97 As we have seen, Roach identifies several
aspects of environmental resources that make damages inadequate: they are
not simply commodities; environmental harm is cumulative; restorationis
often impossible; and the destruction of resources should not be "decided
by the unilateral exercise of power."98

Perell indicates that the role of irreparable harm in the interlocutory
injunction test is to determine which of all available remedies is the best:
"[i]rreparable harm simply means that in a particular context an equitable
remedy is better than damages. Indeed, damages remain a viable alternative
remedy in all cases." 99 Perell argues that favouring damages itself reveals
a definite judicial philosophy: "substitutional relief ... manifests a faith
in the philosophy of free enterprise and the marketplace as the place for
a remedy."' 0 Rendleman suggests that the meaning of irreparable harm
is not limited to the inadequacy of damages. "Inadequacy of damages"

95. R.JR MacDonald,supranote 2 at para. 59, citing Mullin, supranote 3 [emphasis added]. As noted
below, RIR Macdonald and Metro have been criticized as general interlocutory injunction precedents
because they are constitutional cases involving challenges to legislation and therefore by definition
damages are inadequate and harm is irreparable in that context. See D.A. Crerar, "The Death of the
Irreparable Injury Rule in Canada" (1998) 36 Alta. Law Rev. 957 and Ahem, supra note 88, among
others. I argue that in environmental cases, a similar presumption should be made that damages are
inadequate and harm irreparable.
96. Laycock, supra note 94 at 116.
97. Elgie, supra note 2 makes the argument that ecosystems are difficult to rebalance, and that
environmental goods such as old growth forests are irreplaceable. Elgie also notes that the American
caselaw often finds environmental harm to be irreparable; see Elgie ibid.at 396-98.
98. Roach, supra.note 17. He makes some of these statements in reference to Aboriginal interests in
land, but I argue that they are also appropriate to environmental resources themselves.
99. Perell, supra note 95 at 544. John Melvin Paterson, A Treatise on the Law and Practiceof
Injunctions 6"1 ed. (Holmes Beach, FL.: Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., 1981) at 17-18 [Paterson] also
defines irreparable harm: "[i]f the act complained of threatens to destroy the subject matter in question,
the case may come within the principle, even though the damages may be capable of being accurately
measured."
100. Perell, supranote 94 at 542.
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means that damages are "less efficient, speedy and practical" than equitable
relief, while "irreparable harm" means harm that "cannot be measured,
compensated, restored or repaired."'' 1 Some courts and authors emphasize
that whether or not it is possible to compensate the harm with damages, it
is not appropriate to do so.10 2 Others have used the term "irremediable" in

contrast to "irreparable," to emphasize the uniqueness and permanence of
environmental loss. Given the range of meanings, it is important that courts
enunciate clearly the sense in which the harm is deemed to be irreparable,
or precisely why it is found to be non-compensable by damages. Lack of
clarity can confuse the issues, as we will see below.
An argument infavour of maintaining the irreparableharm test as a
separatebranch
Some have argued that the interlocutory injunction test should be a twopronged test, with the irreparable harm consideration simply one factor
in the balance of convenience test, as in the leading B.C. case of Wale." 3
However, I argue that in the environmental context, irreparable harm must
be a separate branch of the test. It is often argued that the essential effect of
Cyanamidwas to put most of the emphasis on the balance of convenience
test, in that once a serious question has beer shown, the analysis moves
on to the balance of convenience.'" However, Cyanamid provides that it
is only "where there is doubt as to the adequacy of the respective remedies
in damages available to either party or to both, that the question of balance

101. D. Rendleman, supra note 39 at 346. Others suggest that there are several meanings of
"irreparable" and that its meaning changes in different contexts: Sharpe, supranote 16 at 2.390-2.460;
Leubsdorf, supra note 66 at 551. Sofronoff, supra note 80 at 346, suggests that "there is a distinction
between the ability to quantify damages in this context and the capacity of such damages really to
substitute for the loss of a right to engage in conduct; to substitute for it in a worthwhile way."
102. See also Bolton, supra note 75. Perell, supra note 94 has pointed out that even life itself is not
irreparable in the sense that its loss is often compensated through damages in personal injury cases.
However, his argument is only true when referring to situations when the life has already been lost.
If there was an interlocutory decision that could prevent this loss, a court would find this harm to be
irreparable and prevent it: see Crerar, supra note 95 at 983. Obviously in cases where environmental
harm has already occurred before the case comes before the court, the court must then consider how
the harm can best be compensated or undone, if at all. In the case of serious environmental harm, as
in the case of human health or life, any damage award remains inappropriate and in no way actually
compensates for the loss, but is merely the best tool currently available to attempt compensation, and
deterrence of future harm. However, the observation of Perell that it is possible to give damages as a
remedy for any kind of harm highlights the fact that the choice of appropriate remedy is a statement
by the court of the kind of value a particular thing has in the priorities of society.
103. Supra note 65.
104. This is the approach of many B.C. courts, following Wale, supra note 65. See also Crerar, supra
note 95.
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of convenience arises."' 5 This suggests that it is irreparability which is
the main factor: if the plaintiff shows a threat of irreparable harm to the
environment, there should be a presumption that an injunction will be
granted, unless the defendant also risks irreparable harm.10 6 Only if both
interests risk irreparableharm should the court move on to the balance of
convenience.
Separating the irreparable harm test is important in environmental
cases because environmental interlocutory injunctions are often refused
because at the balance of convenience stage, the courts balance extensive
but reparable harm to the competing interest(s) against irreparable
harm to the environment. The Clayoquot protest injunction is once again
illustrative. In extending the injunction against the protestors,107 the
analysis of the entire interlocutory injunction test is limited to a single
paragraph:
Here there is a fair question raised by the plaintiff [logging company] to
the rights it alleges; irreparable harm could occur to it if it is prevented
from carrying on its permitted activities. ... As McLachlin J.A., noted at
p. 345 of Wale:' "The fundamental question in each case is whether the
granting of an injunction is just and equitable in all the circumstances of
the case. 08
This is hardly an exhaustive analysis of irreparable harm to both sides or of
the economic, social, political and environmental realities of the situation.
It is a decision stating that private property trumps all other interests. This
conclusion also rests on shaky ground. First, it is in direct contradiction
to the findings of the B.C. Court of Appeal in Mullin that clearcutting
old growth forests would cause irreparable harm. Secondly, it failed to
make the distinction between harm which could be remedied by damages,
105. It is interesting to note that in Cyanamid, Lord Diplock on the facts of that case decided that there
was a serious issue, and that the patent judge and Court of Appeal should have therefore considered the
balance of convenience. He deferred to the patent judge's expertise and found no reason to interfere
with his view that the balance of convenience favoured the injunction. However, no discussion of the
adequacy of damages or irreparable harm was undertaken, and all of the loss threatened to either side
was financial or involved market share. Cyanamid, supra note 5 at 511-12.
106. Martin supranote 2 at399 agrees: "Under a more precautionary analysis, the courts should first
assume that the balance of convenient favours the protection of the environment. To some extent, a
court should consider that it has a duty to protect and uphold what the Supreme Court has qualified as
a fundamental value. Any reasonable evidence of harm should shift the burden of evidence to the party
suspected of injuring an ecosystem to demonstrate that the harm would indeed be reversible, if the
interlocutory injunction was denied. Moreover, purely financial or economic considerations should not
be advanced as a justification to tilt the balance of convenient in favour of a respondent. Additionally,
authorities should not enjoy any advantage of presumption that their decisions are made in the public
interest, when these decisions entail a degree of environmental disruption."
107. MacMillan Bloedel Lid. v. Simpson (1993), 106 D.L.R. (4") 540 (B.C.C.A.).
108. Ibid. at 567.
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and harm which could not. The Court in Mullin held that a company as
large as MacMillan Bloedel would not face bankruptcy or financial harm
severe enough to make it even arguably irreparable. Without this risk
of irreparable harm, the injunction against the protestors stood on even
less firm ground, and it may not have been enforced with such vigour
if the financial delay to MacMillan Bloedel had been determined to be
serious but reparable, rather than triggering the interlocutory injunction
by a finding of irreparable harm. 1°9 This is why it is important to consider
only harms that are irreparable at the second stage of the test. Serious but
reparable harms can be factored in at the balance of convenience stage.
Irreparableharm and environmental ethics
Another interesting aspect of the irreparable harm test is that forces a reexamination of underlying values and priorities, in law and in society.
This factor allows us to question a frequently encountered presumption
that all interests are commensurable. This presumption stems in part from
the fact that, as environmental philosophers have argued, most Western
thinking since the Industrial Revolution has favoured the instrumental
value of things over their intrinsic value, largely because intrinsic value
is difficult to identify and calculate. "[W]hen a measurable instrumental
value (such as profit) conflicts with intangible and elusive intrinsic value
(such as the beauty of a wilderness), the instrumental value too often
wins by default." 10 Environmental principles such as precaution, and an
awareness of ecological realities, would assist courts in reassessing the
various values at odds in litigation. While the goal is not always to favour
environmental preservation, the purpose is to ensure that traditional views
automatically favouring profit or development do not prevent the varied

109. Findings that economic harms are irreparable continue to be found in the most recent
environmental caselaw. For example, in Hupacasath First Nation v. British Columbia, [2005] 2
C.N.L.R. 138 (B.C.S.C.) at paras. 69-70, the Court held that "[tihere is clear potential for business
disruption and damages flowing from a failure of the transaction to close. However, the petitioners
have given no undertaking as to damages. The petitioners have raised concerns with respect to their
ability to exercise their Aboriginal rights and title to protect the environment and their sacred sites and
to have effective consultation under the new regime and with new owners. However, this harm is at
this stage potential only." The decision in CanadianSablefish Assn. v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries
& Oceans), 2004 FC 983 is a mere five paragraphs in length. The opening sentences are: "Aquaculture
is an important industry in British Columbia. It sometimes.., raises environmental concerns in some
quarters." At paragraph 3 and 4 the court held that there was no evidence of harm, since "information
currently available is not adequate to assess the potential impact of sablefish aquaculture," however
"irreparable harm could well be suffered by the commercial respondents to this application and
indeed by other hatcheries and fish farms" and therefore it was not necessary move to the balance of
convenience-the injunction was refused with costs.
110. Joseph R. Des Jardins, Environmental Ethics, 2d ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing
Company, 1997) at 130.
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and more subtle values of environmental protection from at least being
fully weighed in the balance.
Where environmental harm is limited in space or time, courts have
found this compensable by damages.'" Yet courts have taken a more
preventative and precautionary approaching in finding that other kinds
of environmental harm are irreparable: for example, such as harm that is
permanent or related to unique natural resources." 2 Again, environmental
principles could help to reduce these inconsistencies of approach. Further,
rulings of irreparability are difficult to obtain due.to the burden of proof,
and the precautionary principle is particularly helpful for this.
Reversing the burden ofproving irreparableharm
The burden on those seeking an injunction to prove that the harm alleged is
irreparable is heavy, yet courts wrestle with shifting it, The Precautionary
Principle is widely recognized to include reversing the burden of proof,"3
yet its application has varied in injunction cases. Some courts require
clear proof of harm. '4 Yet for others, a showing of a risk of harm, or the
possibility that damages will be inadequate," 5 is enough. Occasionally,
the burden has been placed on the defendant to convince the court that the
risk of harm should not be prevented pending trial."6 This precautionary
approach is appropriate in the context of environmental harm." 7 David
VanderZwaag argues further that precaution could induce a change not only
in the burden, but also in the standard, of proof in injunction decisions:
The precautionary principle, while still evolving in its.legal development,
but suggesting the need to grant the benefit of doubt to environmental
protection rather than high risk activities, may be the creative normative
wedge to rethink common law doctrines such as nuisance and injunctive
requirements. Something less than a serious health risk, for example,
reasonable medical or ecological concern, might be considered to amount
to a nuisance. The burden of proof regarding a reasonable concern might
be shifted from plaintiffs to defendants who would have to show the lack

Ill. See River Road (Residents o) v. Fundy Region Solid Waste Commission (1997), 26 C.E.L.R.
(N.S.) 82 (N.B.Q.B.) (amount of landfill leachate that would escape before trial limited).
112. See e.g., the cases of Palmer (pesticides), Baker Lake (interference with caribou life cycles) and
Mullin (longing old-growth trees), supra notes 3 and 86.
113. See Charmian Barton, "The Status of the Precautionary Principle in Australia: Its Emergence
in Legislation and as a Common Law Doctrine" (1998) 22 Harv. Env. L. Rev. 509. See also Jamie
Benidickson et al. "Practicing Precaution and Adaptive Management: Legal, Institutional and
Procedural Dimensions of. Scientific Uncertainty" (SSHRC and Law Commission of Canada, June
2005), online: <http://www.ie.uottawa.ca/English/Reports/JBPPFinalReport.pdf> at F- 18.
114. See Edwards and Banff supranote 70.
115. Wale, supra note 65.
116. See Palmer,supra note 65 and Bolton, supranote 75.
117. See Olson, supranote 78.
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of a reasonable medical or ecological concern before being allowed to
undertake industrial or development activities. One may also envision a
change in the injunctive standardof proof from a strong probability to

something less, such as a reasonable possibility."8

This precautionary idea of preserving the environmental resources in cases
of doubt is also supported by an older and more entrenched approach to
interlocutory injunctions in the case of interference with land, as we see
next.
Preservingthe property

There is also a line of analysis that focuses not on irreparable harm to the
plaintiff, or even to the defendant, but on irreparable harm to the subject
matter of the litigation, particularly when that subject matter consists
of property. This is often cited to Wheatley v. Ellis,"9 a case preceding
Cyanamid by some thirty years, which states that where the plaintiff
has shown a serious issue and "can satisfy the Court that the property
should be preserved in its present actual condition until the question can
be disposed of," an injunction should issue, even without consideration
of irreparable harm to the parties or to the balance of convenience. 12 0 In
Kerr on Injunctions, 2 ' one of the first sections in the text is entitled "The
Protection of Legal Rights to Property Pending Litigation," which claims
that "[t]he protection of legal fights to property from irreparable or at least
from serious damage pending the trial of the legal right was part of the
original and proper office of the Court of Chancery."' 22 The essence of this
jurisdiction is as follows:
In exercising the jurisdiction the Court does not pretend to determine
the legal rights to property, but merely keeps the property in its actual

condition until the legal title can be established. The Court interferes on
the assumption that the party who seeks its interference has the legal
right which he asserts, but needs the aid of the Court for the protection of

the property in question until the legal right can be ascertained.2 3

118. D. VanderZwaag, Canada and Marine Environmental Protection: Charting a Legal Course
Towards Sustainable Development (London: Kluwer Law International, 1995) at 407-08 [emphasis
added].
119. Supranote65.
120. Sometimes this is also called preserving the status quo, which Cyanamid said should be a
consideration but only where the harm to both parties is evenly balanced and other factors are needed
to determine whether to issue the injunction. See also s. 752 of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure,
supra note 13, and discussion of the status quo, supra note 110 and accompanying text.
12 1. Paterson,supra note 99, cited in Wheatley v. Ellis, supra note 65.
122. Paterson, supra note 99 at 15.
123. Ibid.
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The central problem this approach seeks to avoid is the situation
where courts can no longer do justice in the final decision, as would be
the case if the subject matter of the litigation were gone. This is the same
broad principle that justifies Anton Piller orders, 24 and other pre-trial
property-protecting measures, and is the approach in the general Quebec
interlocutory injunction test.
This approach was taken in Wheatley, a logging dispute as to which
of two private parties had the right to the profits .of the logging, i.e. not
involving environmental protection concerns. Yet in the environmental
decision in Mullin, the Court said that the test "in a case such as this" was
that set out in Wheatley, and concluded that the land had to be preserved
until trial. The approach was clarified in Wale, which stated that "[t]he
question of preservation of property, as Wheatley and MacMillan Bloedel
[v. Mullin] illustrate, has repeatedly been treated as one of irreparable
harm justifying an injunction. It is obvious that if the property which is
the subject of litigation is altered pending trial, damages may not offer
25
complete compensation."1
This logic has been followed by courts when protecting property
ownership.As highlighted above when discussing anti-protest injunctions,
the courts have very recently confirmed the importance of preserving
property from interference by environmental protesters. In Hamilton (City)
v. Loucks1 26 the court enjoined Aboriginal protests against construction
of an expressway, holding that where there is a threat to property rights,
the owner should get an injunction, without the court having to consider
irreparable harm or the balance of convenience:
Regarding the interference with property rights, Justice Robert J. Sharpe
in his book entitled Injunctions and Specific Performance, looseleaf
edition, at paragraph 4.610 wrote, ' ....
the rules that generally apply
to injunctions do not always apply in cases such as this. The balance
of convenience and other matters may have to take second place to the
sacrosanctity of property rights in matters of trespass. ... Where the
plaintiff complains of an interference with property rights, injunctive
relief is strongly favoured. This is especially so in the case of direct
infringement in the nature of trespass.. .Where property rights are
concerned, it is almost that damages are presumed inadequate and an
injunction to restrain continuation of the wrong is the usual remedy.'
Therefore, in my view if there is a serious question to be tried regarding
interference with the plaintiff's property rights, then an injunction will

124. See generally Sharpe, supra note 16 at paragraph 2.1100-2.1300 and sources cited therein, and
see his Chapter 4 on "Injunctions to Protect Property."
125. Wale, supra note 65.
126. (2003), 232 D.L.R. (4 1) 362 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
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be the usual remedy.27

Yet, as these very protest cases show, this approach of protecting the
property itself has not been followed. 28 Yet a precautionary approach to
environmental protection indicates that protecting the property or subject
matter of the litigation from threats of serious or irreparable harm should
be front and centre in all environmental disputes, because environmental
harm is harm to property. Where there is doubt, there should be a
presumption that the property itself should be protected until trial, and the
burden should shift to those wanting to harm it. There is enough precedent
to ground such a presumption, 29 yet it should remain rebuttable, because
of the reality that there are variations in kinds and degree of environmental
harm, an issue to which we now turn.
Degrees of irreparability
Clearly, there are many kinds of environmental resources, and different
kinds and degrees of environmental harm. Clear-cutting old growth forests
for financial gain might be distinguishable qualitatively and quantitatively

127. Ibid. at paras. 25-27. Justice Henderson explicitly adopted the Loucks reasons in his subsequent
judgment in John Voortman & Associates Ltd. v. HaudenosauneeConfederacy Chiefs Council, [2009]
O.J. No. 1350 to enjoin Aboriginal protesters from interfering with construction of a subdivision.
128. It is interesting that in Wale, supra note 65, the B.C. government was challenging aboriginal bylaws governing fishing on a reserve, and the majority held that the trial judge had not erred in refusing
a stay of the regulations. The majority assumed that the government's efforts to protect fish stocks
were in the public interest, without considering whether the aboriginal management of fish provided
more or less protection of the resource. The dissent held that the injunction was undesirable as this
was a political issue and judicial interference would prevent a satisfactory political answer from being
developed. The case also reveals two definitions of the status quo-the majority found that the status
quo was to let the provincial government continue to do its job, while the minority found the status
quo in allowing existing aboriginal by-laws to continue until proven unlawful.
129. Mullin, supra note 3 (logging old-growth forests on land subject to Aboriginal land claims);
Tosorontio, supra note 65 (risk of exposure to nuclear radiation); Kannata, supra note 71; Caddy
Lake, supra note 76 ("damages will not compensate for a destroyed forest") Palmer,supra note 65
and Bolton, supra note 75 (pesticide cases); Kilkatla, supra note 65 ("plaintiffs could be deprived
of something which is priceless," at trial). Of course, there are many which have found that it is
not: Mullin motions judge; WCWC v. A.G. (B.C.), supra note 66 (damage to old growth forests
not irreparable); Red Mountain Residents, supra note 93; Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society
(CPA WS) v. Banff NationalPark Superintendentet al.; Sunshine Village Corp. v. Canada(Minister of
CanadianHeritage)et al. (1996), 202 N.R. 132 (F.C.A.); aff'g [1995] 1 F.C. 420 (T.D.); application
for leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed [1996] S.C.C.A. No. 498. and Edivards (harm from insecticides
vs. harm from beetles), supra note 70; Siska Indian Bond v. B.C. (Minister of Forests) (1998), 28
C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 188 (B.C.S.C.), [19991 B.C.J. No. 2354 (B.C.S.C.) (harm from logging road reparable
by damages; financial harm to small company greater than to large company: delay in logging
irreparable harm to small family business). In other cases, the court does try to balance reparable and
irreparable harms: e.g., the Rafferty-Alameda dam case, supra note 86 (at trial, financial harm to the
defendants outweighed the "remote". possibility of unmitigable environmental harm). Similarly, see
Kitkatla, supra note 65 (interim injunction pending appeal-aboriginal plaintiffs unlikely to win on
merits-harm to loggers outweighs unlikely harm to aboriginal plaintiffs).
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from removing a few trees to enlarge a road to enhance the safety of drivers
and pedestrians - the distinction between Mullin and Friends of Stanley
Park,'a where public safety on the roads in Stanley Park outweighed the
very limited interference with the environment that road enlargement
represented. This is consistent with the general injunction context.
Laycock argues that there are degrees of irreparability in the injunctive
relief analysis:
Harms vary over a range of irreparability, and this range is partly
independent of their variation over a range of severity and over a range
of likelihoods. Stated in terms of adequacy, the remedy at final judgment
may be slightly adequate... seriously inadequate, nearly worthless, or
something in between. Implicitly, the degree of irreparability is a separate
variable in the balancing test for preliminary injunctions. 3'
Yet he notes that injunctions are also more precise tools than generally
perceived. The court can include "a range of possible conditions and a
range of bond requirements" to reduce the risk of harm to both sides.
Ideally, courts will analyze as closely as possible the true harm and
its irreparability, and their capacity to do this should increase as their
environmental awareness increases. But if they are reluctant to do this
fine-tuning, the presumption that environmental harm is irreparable should
remain the guiding principle.
Whose irreparableharm?
The irreparable harm test should not limit itself to consideration of the
interests of the two parties. In environmental cases, irreparable harm to
the public interest should always be considered. Legislation or public
authorities are presumed to protect the public interest, but as discussed
above, since there may be competing public interests, and since
government sometimes represents the interests of its own agenda or of
-powerful lobby groups. In two pesticide cases, the court -held that there
were public interests competing with the position of the government. In
Bolton,'32 these included the public interest in the forest industry and in a
healthy environment. In Friendsof PointPleasantPark,33 a public interest
group opposed plans by local authorities to cut down trees in the park
suspected of being "infected with the spruce bark beetle."' 13 4 The court
granted the interlocutory injunction, but recognized the conflict between
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Frindsof Stanley Park, supra note 65.
Laycock, supra note 94 at 121.
Supra note 75.
Supra note 65.
Ibid. at 47.
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the public interest in protecting trees and the public interest in allowing the
government to prevent harmful infestations.135 My argument is that courts
should always inquire as to what the public interest(s) in the environment
are, who is representing them, and whether they would be irreparably
harmed by refusing an injunction.
Apart from the public interest, an environmental framework would
also lead the courts to consider whether irreparable harm might be
caused to the environment itself as a valued entity, worthy of independent
protection, as argued by scholars such as Christopher Stone in "Should
Trees Have Standing?' ' 36 and by many in the environmental movement,
such as the deep ecologists. 37 This is particularly warranted in interlocutory
injunction decisions, precisely because it is the environment itself which is
not reparable, and which needs to be preserved until the final outcome of
the dispute can be decided.
I emphasize that the courts should be active in seeking out the various
irreparable harms that could occur in each case, whether the parties
have raised them all or not. The dangers of not doing so are illustrated

135. Ibid. at 59: "In the present case, the applicants representing public interest [sic] will be greatly
inconvenienced if the injunction is not granted and the trees are cut down but the judicial review
application is ultimately successful. There would be a finding that the Notice to Dispose was invalid,
but the trees would already be gone." While this case was difficult in that the competing public interests
were both environmental interests, the court refused to presume that the government represented the
only public interest. The court looked to the facts and balanced the risks. It is possible that the Court
was less inclined to defer to the government in this case because a similar plan to cut down the trees
due to the beetles ten years earlier had been cancelled when a members of the public, some of whom
were involved in this case, undertook their own research and found that the suspected beetle was not
present.
136. Christopher D. Stone, "Should Trees Have Standing?-Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects"
(1972) 45 So. Cal. L. Rev. 450.
137. Represented primarily by Arne Naess, see his works "The Shallow and the Deep, Long Range
Ecology Movements: A Summary" (1973) 16 Inquiry 95, and Ecology, Community and Lifestyle
trans. David Rothenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) and other works cited in
Clare Palmer, "An Overview of Environmental Ethics" in Andrew Light & Holmes Rolston Ill, eds.,
Environmental Ethics: An Anthology (Maiden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003) at 29-30 and in
Joseph R. Deslardins, Environmental Ethics: An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy, 2d ed.
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1997) at c. 10, this school of thought encourages
people to become more aware of their connectedness to nature, and to overcome the false dichotomy
between humans and nature, which would lead to living with greater respect for other parts of nature. It
is based on biocentric equality, the intrinsic value of nature, holism and self-realization (Palmer, supra
note 65 at 30; Karin Mickelson and W. Rees, "The Environment: Ecological and Ethical Dimensions"
in HLT, supra note 33 at 24-26). It tends to focus on local responses, communalism, democracy and
a reduction in consumerism, and relying less on reason and more on feelings or connectedness. It is
unlikely judges will be quick to adopt a deep ecology approach, yet it demonstrates just how deeply
humans should question prevailing legal ethics and structures.
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in cases such as Yellow Quill' 38 and Tsay Keh Dene,139 where plaintiffs
claimed damages, and the court took this to be proof that the harm was not
irreparable. The court should have assessed whether the harm was truly
irreparable, and tried to protect the environment as well as, or even above,
the interests of the immediate parties. This is why threats of irreparable harm
not only to the parties, but also to the public interest and the environment
itself, should be considered in all environmental cases, particularly at the
interlocutory stage. If a risk of irreparable harm is found, the next step is
to assess the balance of convenience.
3. Balance of convenience
The balance of convenience test can be distinguished from the
irreparable harm test as follows:
The second test consists in deciding whether the litigant who seeks
the interlocutory injunction would, unless the injunction is granted,
suffer irreparable harm, that is harm not susceptible or difficult to be
compensated in damages. ... The third test, called the balance of
convenience and which ought perhaps to be called more appropriately
the balance of inconvenience, is a determination of which of the two
parties will suffer the greater harm from the granting or refusal of an
interlocutory injunction, pending a decision on the merits. 140
After citing this description of the balance of convenience test, the Court
in RJR MacDonaldalso included a reminder of the Cyanamid case:
The factors which must be considered in assessing the 'balance of
convenience' are numerous and will vary in each individual case. In
American Cyanamid, Lord Diplock cautioned, at p. 408, that: 'It would
be unwise to attempt even to list all the various matters which may need
to be taken into consideration in deciding where the balance lies, let
alone to suggest the relevant weight to be attached to them. These will
vary from case to case.' He added, at p. 409, that 'there may be many
other special factors to be taken into consideration in the particular
circumstances of individual cases.' 141
The balance of convenience branch is perhaps the most discretionary
element of the test, as it expressly requires courts to balance competing

138. Yellow Quill First Nation v.Sask (Min.Env. & Resource Mgmt) (1999), 32 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 132
(Sask. Q.B.).
139. Tsay Keh Dene Band v. B.C. (Min. Envir., Lands & Parks) (1997), 24 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 66

(B.C.S.C.).
140. Metro Stores, supra note 9 at 334.
141. RJR MacDonald, supra note 2 at 406-7.
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interests on the basis of limited information and argument. Again, due to
the uncertainty involved, a precautionary approach is warranted.
Status quo
One guideline that courts use to assist in balancing competing interests is
the status quo. Cyanamidprovides that "where everything else is equal 'it
is a counsel of prudence to ... preserve the status quo'.'1 42 The Supreme
Court and many commentators have found the status quo test to be "of
limited value," due to the vagueness of the term, both with regard to when
the status quo should be determined, and whether it is in fact possible to
maintain the status quo.
In Metropolitan Stores, the Trial Division usefully clarified the
confusion that can arise when using the term, particularly when its precise
operation on the facts is not specified. "The employer argues that the
granting of a stay will maintain the status quo between the parties until the
constitutional challenge has been dealt with. I cannot accept that argument.
The entire notion of maintaining a status quo in these circumstances
is fanciful," given that unionization was new and weak in the relevant
industry.' '. RJR Macdonaldprovided that the status quo test is "of limited
value in private law cases" and generally "has no merit as such in the face
of the alleged violation of fundamental rights. One of the functions of the
.Charter is to provide individuals with a tool to challenge the existing order
of things or status quo."' This notion of litigation as a form of protest
against "business as usual" is central to many environmental cases, and
once again the Clayoquot case is illustrative.

142. Ibid at 410.
143. MetropolitanStores (MTS) Ltd v. Manitoba Food & Commercial Workers (1985), 22 C.C.R.
156 at para. 5 (Man. Q.B.). While the Supreme Court did not directly address the status quo issue, it
did agree with the findings of the trial judge and decided that legislation should be allowed to operate
until it has been proven unconstitutional.
144. RJR MacDonald,supra note 2 at 410.
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Sharpe agrees that the status quo test "adds little or nothing to the
analysis and, in fact, may produce a possible source of confusion. '"45
Yet this suggests that the test could be useful if its meaning were clearly
understood and stated. Perell distinguishes two meanings of status quo,
arguing that while not helpful where used "in the sense of keeping the
parties in their places", the test can be illuminating where it is used to mean
"preserving the court's ability to be fair to both sides". 46 This has also been
phrased as follows: "The concept status quo lacks sufficient stability to
provide a satisfactory foundation for judicial reasoning. The better course
is to consider directly how best to preserve or create a state of affairs in
which effective relief can be awarded to either party at the conclusion of
the trial.' 14 (emphasis added) This clarification that the court should either
preserve or create a situation that preserves the court's ability to do justice
responds to Leubsdorf's point that the test is not helpful because a "court
interferes just as much when it orders the status quo preserved as when it
changes it,' ' 48 and is another aspect of the final effect test.
In the environmental caselaw, the status quo has been interpreted in
starkly contrasting ways: either to mean that further harm to the environment
should be prevented, or on the contrary that the current development or
interference with the environment should continue until proven wrongful.
The latter include cases such as Banff where the court held that "the
status quo would be better maintained by declining to interfere with the
completion of the current cutting programme ...
In this situation, it seems
to me that the status quo is represented by the orderly development plan
145. Sharpe, supranote 16 at paras. 2.550-570. Indeed, its undefined use can be dangerous if it masks
the true reasons for decision: is the court using the term as a catch phrase when it is choosing not to
interfere because it does not know what to do, or is it avoiding the risk of causing harm itself and
preferring to allow existing harm to continue? CBC v. CKPG Television, [1992] 3 W.W.R. 279 at 286
(B.C.C.A.), a case involving breach of a television broadcasting agreement, sets out a much more
detailed analysis of the status quo: "there are at least three separate aspects to the consideration of
the status quo. I think that all three are conceptually important but that their respective importance to
the assessment of the balance of convenience in any particular case will vary with the circumstances.
The first aspect involves a consideration of which party took the step which first brought about the
alteration in their relationship which led to an alleged actionable breach of the rights of one of the
parties; the second aspect involves a consideration of which party took the action which is said to be
an actionable breach of the rights of the other party; and the third aspect involves a consideration of
the nature of the conduct which is said to be wrongful and which is being carried on at the time that
the application for the interim injunction is brought." Unfortunately the case does not elaborate on this
as the decision turned on the serious question test. In addition, though it focuses exclusively on the
behaviour of the parties, rather than what is often more useful in environmental cases, i.e. preserving
the disputed property and resources, it is useful in determining the relevant status quo.
146. Perell, supra note 94 at 548.
147. "Injunctions: Developments in the Law" (1965) 78 Harv. L. Rev. 994 at 1058.
148. Leubsdorf, supranote 66 at 546. See also Ahem, supra note 88 at 49: "the concept adds nothing
to the legal analysis of the relevant issues."
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which has been elaborated over the last 15 years."' 49 Other courts use the
status quo to justify taking no action, so that any risk imposed on either
party is not a result of court action, but of the pre-existing situation, which
is simply continued until trial.
I argue that in the special circumstances of environmental interlocutory
injunctions, the emphasis should not be on preserving the status quo, but
on preserving the environmental resource itself. The irreparable harm
stage should be central in environmental cases and if there is a serious risk
of irreparable harm to the environment, there should be a presumption in
favour of preserving the property until trial unless there is clear evidence
that competing interests are also irreparable. As Olson 5 ° argues, a pristine
or less damaged environment should be considered the status quo. This is
the most ecologically literate interpretation of status quo and the only one
that truly values environmental interests. 5'
A public law approach
Another difficulty in applying the balance of convenience test is one
of the core problems with the environmental jurisprudence generally. This
is that environmental litigation tends to still be treated as private law, and
thus the balancing of interests is assessed within that framework. Yet some
recognize environmental law as at least a special kind of private law:
I do not mean to imply that all private disputes are reducible to this
model. There are, for example, occasions on which injunctions are sought
to prevent harm to cultural and aesthetic values, or to preserve a 'way of
life' as in many environmental disputes.'52 However, it is precisely in such
circumstances that the difficulties in balancing the respective degrees of
harm to the parties' interests multiplies, because these interests are noncomparable. The question before the court is not which party stands to
suffer the greater harm, but rather what interests deserve protection and
how are those interests to be valued.'53 [emphasis added]

149. CPAWS, supra note 70 at 17.
150. Supra note 78.
151. I am indebted to Prof. Lynda Collins for this suggestion.
152. Citing Mullin, supra note 3 and Ominayak et al. v. Norcen Energy Resources Limited et aL,
[198312 C.N.L.R. 99 (Alta. Q.B.); [1983] 3 C.N.L.R. 83 (Alta. Q.B.); [1984] 4 C.N.L.R. 27 (Alta.
Q.B.); [1984] 4 C.N.L.R. 34 (Alta. Q.B.); [1985] I S.C.R. xi.
153. J.Cassels, "An Inconvenient Balance: The Injunction as a Charter Remedy" in Jeffrey Berryman,
ed., Remedies: Issues and Perspectives(Toronto, Carswell: 1991) 271 at 306 [Cassels]. He also argues
that the distinction between private and public law is blurred, as they display many similarities and
differences.
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Favouring jobs over trees is not just a judicial balancing of competing
interests.'54 It is a social, political, economic and philosophical choice, and
the choices that our courts make not only reflect our current values, but can
either reinforce or challenge them. Each interlocutory injunction decisions
is a small stone in the way we build the society we aspire to live in. The
place of environmental protection in our social priorities is reflected-or
enhanced or reduced-by these crucial decisions, and courts should be
aware of this and make it explicit in their analysis and reasons. Although
courts are not representative in the same way that legislatures are, they
do reflect and shape the values and beliefs that our society upholds by the
very existence and operation of these institutions.
This is why the approach to injunctions in public law is instructive.
The two leading cases on interlocutory injunctions in Canada both involve
challenges to the constitutionality of legislation. Metro Stores involved
a challenge to Manitoba legislation which allowed the Labour Board to
impose a first collective agreement where negotiation failed. The trial
division refused to stay'55 the Board's decision to impose an agreement,
the Court of Appeal granted a stay, and the Supreme Court reinstated
the trial decision, allowing the Labour Board's decision to operate until
the legislation was proven to breach the Charter. R.JR Macdonald'516 also
involved an application for a stay, in that case of the implementation
of regulations under the Tobacco Products Control Act'57 until their
constitutional validity was finally determined.

154. "[There is] a ... popular conception that the environment is one among many priorities ... We
are naive if we assume that the environment is one choice among others. Instead, it is time that we
paid heed to the fact that the environment constitutes the very sustenance of all life. 'The environment'
is the inescapable condition of the possibility of the emergence of other sectoral priorities." Ingrid
Leman Stefanovic, Safeguarding Our Common Future: Rethinking Sustainable Development (Albany,
NY: State University of New York Press, 2000) at 42.
155. Metro Stores, supra note 9 at 332, 334. The Supreme Court held that "A stay of proceedings and
an interlocutory injunction are remedies of the same nature." However, stays differ from preliminary
decisions in that "[tlhe facts are not in dispute" and the arguments have been fully made by all parties,
so that the decision is interlocutory or preliminary only in the sense that a final decision has not been
reached in the sense of exhausting all appeals. See also Leubsdorf, supra note 66 at n. 162.
156. Supra note 2.
157. R.S.C. 1985, c. 14 (4th Supp.)
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In RJR Macdonald, the court held that constitutional law cases are
different'55 because of (i) "the importance of the interests"' 9 ; (ii) the fact
that "the complex nature of most constitutional rights means that a motions
court will rarely have the time to engage in the requisite extensive analysis
of the merits of the applicant's claim"; and (iii) the fact that constitutional
cases involve the public interest,160 or are polycentric.'16 These factors which

the Court isolates as requiring a special approach to stays or injunctions in
constitutional law are very similar to those in environmental litigation.
This rationale for why the approach to interlocutory injunctions
would be different in private and public law contexts is set out in further
detail by Cassels. Private law has traditionally'62 been characterized
by balancing harm between two parties, whose injuries will generally

158. RJR MacDonald, supra note 2 at para. 47. It made these distinctions in the context of assessing
whether the standard should be raised above a "serious issue" where an injunction is sought after
decision has been made at trial, since some argue there can be no serious issue if the merits have
already been determined at least once. The court assessed several arguments, but concluded that
"[wihether or not these statements reflect the state of the law in private applications for interlocutory
relief, which may well be open to question, they have no application in Charter cases." Yet I would
argue that these factors are not limited to injunctions pending appeal.
159. RJR MacDonald, supra note 2 at para. 48. This case also involved an issue of public health: it
held that tobacco legislation is a "public welfare initiativ[e]" (at para. 83), and was for "the common
good." It lists the Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement and preamble to the tobacco regulations
in question to demonstrate "the undeniable importance of the public interest in health and in the
prevention of the widespread and serious medical problems directly attributable to smoking" (at para.
93), which clearly outweigh financial harm, even significant financial harm, to the tobacco companies
and smokers themselves.
160. A similar approach was taken in Metro Stores, supra note 9 at 332-34, which said that the
"complex factual and legal issues," the "limited evidence available in an interlocutory proceeding"
and the consideration of the public interest in the balance of convenience test made the lower threshold
of a serious question the applicable test in Charter cases. Kent Roach agrees, stating, supra note 17
at para. 7.80 that "The more lenient serious question test is the appropriate test when the applicant
alleges a violation of constitutional rights. Constitutional rights are important enough that courts
should err on the side of considering claims that they need protection from irreparable harm. Some
Charter violations will be difficult to prove before a trial with pleadings, discovery and the hearing
of oral evidence. ... The applicant should receive the benefit of the doubt on the merits, especially
given that he or she will still have to demonstrate.the danger of irreparable harm and that the balance
of convenience favours granting the injunction are central in most environmental litigation, which
suggests the same benefit should be extended to those seeking to prevent harm to the environment"
[emphasis added]. Roach also supports the idea that in Charter cases, irreparable harm should be
presumed, due to the nature of the interests: at para. 7.240.
161. RJR MacDonald, supra note 2, mentions polycentricity at 406. See generally Roach, supra note
17 c. 7; Sharpe, supra note 16, and Cassels, supra note 153 at 271, among others in the extensive
literature on constitutional remedies.
162. Cassels, supra note 153, notes that these oversimplifications are grounds for caution. The
assumptions on which the private law model is based are "highly problematic ... The private law
balancing model is given the appearance of rationality by excluding arguments about the public
interest and denying the 'political' nature of the law. The problem that I have sought to highlight is that
once we reject the assumptions-as we must in Charter litigation-there remains no way 'rationally'
to balance the interests at stake." Cassels, supra note 153 at 309.
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be compensable in damages. Balancing the risks to both sides is easier
because "the litigation is bipolar," and because the harms to the parties are
"commensurable; that is capable of comparison by the same standard,"
which is generally financial.' 63 In Charter litigation (and I would argue
this extends to public law more generally), the perception is that harm is
more frequently irreparable because the interests are not solely financial
("[i]t is not possible to quantify or repair harm to the 'public interest')
and "there are no well-developed principles of liability or compensation
for 'constitutional wrongs'." The dispute is not bipolar, but includes the
interests of third parties and the public. In addition, "[t]he interests and
values at stake in Charter litigation ... are not comparable by a common
standard and therefore not easily weighed against one another." Again,
this equally is true in the environmental law context: the harm is not solely
financial, and cannot easily be compared to economic harm. The disputes
affect the interests of all those dependent on the environment, which is the
public as a whole (including future generations). In environmental law,
the well-developed principles of liability or compensation may in some
cases be adequate to satisfy the private parties but are generally inadequate
to protect the environment itself. 164 This is why environmental law can
be said to always contain at least some public law aspects, which the
Supreme Court has determined require a special approach to interlocutory
injunctions, 65 and why environmental interlocutory injunctions should be
applied with these differences in mind, particularly at the very open-ended
balance of convenience stage.

163. Ibid. at 297-8.
164. The fact that damages are "not the primary remedy in Charter cases" and the "uncertain state
of the law regarding the award of damages for a Charter breach," led the Supreme Court in RJR
Macdonald,supra note II at 406, to suggest that "it will in most cases be impossible for a judge on
an interlocutory application to determine whether adequate compensation could ever be obtained at
trial. Therefore ... it is appropriate to assume that the financial damage which will be suffered by an
applicant following a refusal of relief, even though capable of quantification, constitutes irreparable
harm." See also Cassels, supra note 153 at 300-01. 1 argue that this is the process that should be
followed in environmental litigation: presume irreparable harm, presume an injunction will be granted
unless there is competing irreparable harm, including to the public interest.
165. "Environmental law is one of the better examples of public law. In so far as environmental law
is true environmental law (as opposed to property law or resource allocation law) its aim is to protect
public rights. The protection of the environment, either in order that all society may benefit from
environmental quality (an anthropocentric approach) or for its own sake (an ecocentric approach),
is based clearly around benefits to society as a whole or a philosophical view about the relationship
between people and the natural environment. They are clearly creating and regulatinj public-as
opposed to private-rights." David Mossop, "Citizen Suits: Tools for Improving Compliance with
Environmental Laws" (1993) 18 Alternative Law J. 266 at 267.
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Justifyingpreferences
As seen above, Cassels has argued that in constitutional litigation, "[t]he
question before the court is not which party stands to suffer the greater
harm, but rather what interests deserve protection and how are those
interests to be valued.' 1 66 In applying the balance of convenience test in
environmental cases, this is precisely what the courts are doing. They must
acknowledge that this is the role they are playing, and be more explicit in
explaining how they identify the relevant interests, why they are found
67
worthy of protection, and how they are valued. 1
Again, a precautionary approach would be very useful in this
endeavour. Indeed, this task has been identified as one of its main purposes.
provides grounds for
As Professor Jaye Ellis has argued, "[p]recaution ...
justification of preference of one position over another. ... Reference to
principles of soft law, such as precaution, may provide a basis for preferring
certain arguments to others or for working out a priority among competing
values and interests."' 68 This notion of preference is central to the balance
of convenience element of the interlocutory injunction test, and what is
needed is clearer justification. A precautionary approach would assist
in providing this justification of the valuing and prioritizing done in the
balancing act of environmental interlocutory injunctions.
Conclusion
The grant or refusal of an -interlocutory injunction in environmental law
often makes or breaks the effort to protect environmental resources. It is
the litigation in many environmental disputes, and often can determine
whether the political process has time to effectively play its role in the
resolution of the conflict. The inconsistency of approaches revealed in
the caselaw on interlocutory injunctions suggests that the courts lack a

166. Cassels, supra note 153 at 306.
167. The judges themselves have called for a greater judicial role in environmental law. See Global
Judges Symposium, Johannesburg Principleson the Role of Law and Sustainable Development (20
August 2002), online: <http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2002/wssd0828a.htm>.
168. Jaye Ellis, "The Straddling Stocks Agreement and the Precautionary Principle as Interpretive
Device and Rule of Law" (2001) 32 Ocean Devel. & Intemat'l Law 289 at 291, 305. See also H616ne
Trudeau, "Du droit international au droit interne: l'mergence du principe de pr6caution en droit de
l'environnement" (2003) 28 Queen's L.J. 455. "We think that adherence to the principle of precaution
should translate as taking into account, as most often preponderant, the protection of the environment,
in the face of interests that are strictly economic, without excluding the possibility that these might
prevail in certain cases if the circumstances justify it. In our view, the paradigm change that the
precautionary principle should ideally create is to ensure, even in situations of risk that are uncertain in'
the scientific realm, that the environmental interest be systematically taken into account by decisionmakers instead of systematically ignored. In the realm of the management of uncertain risks, it is
thus more a question of putting the economic dimension back into perspective than of excluding it"
(author's translation).
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focus for interpreting and applying this tool in the environmental context,
and this results in significant danger to the environment. A precautionary
framework is necessary to improve the interpretation. and application of
this "procedural" tool.
A precautionary approach does not seek to prevent the exercisd of
discretion by courts in identifying, valuing and balancing competing
interests. As stated in the discussion on irreparable harm, there are degrees
of irreparability, and where a competing interest is not solely financial
and would risk irreparable harm, the court may decide in its favour. For
example, the courts may decide that public safety is more important than
environmental preservation in a particular case, particularly where the
environmental resource is not rare or endangered. 169 The point is that courts
must clearly identify and enunciate the competing interests, including the
environmental claims, and how and why they are balancing them in this
way at this stage of the litigation.
Recent approaches to environmental problems operate on the
premise that to stop the serious and increasing problem of environmental
degradation, society needs not just to tinker with existing approaches, but
to take on entirely new ways of thinking about problems and priorities. 70
The current global environmental challenge calls for wholesale behavioural
and philosophical changes, including within the judiciary. The environment
is a unique and special sphere, and should be approached as such. Courts
can be leaders in social change and public education, by looking at
environmental problems as particular kinds of issues which warrant their
own tailored approaches. This paper has shown that an environmental
framework, including the precautionary principle, can and should guide the
interpretation and application of procedural rules such as those governing
interlocutory injunctions, thus enhancing the effectiveness of substantive
environmental law.
In interlocutory injunctions, the courts must take the precautionary
approach, enunciate the competing values, presume that environmental
harm is irreparable and that failing to protect the environment pending
trial will be a decision of final effect. They should err on the side of
environmental protection unless the competing interests have been clearly
shown to be also irreparable and to be at least, if not more, important
than the environment. While environmental law principles should not
lead the court always to favour environmental interests, this framework is
169. Friendsof Stanley Park,supra note 65.
170. Olson, supra note 78 at 891 calls for "a radical restructuring of the law's conceptualization of
human responsibility."
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necessary to counter existing presumptions in favour of development and
deference to government, which remain strong and pervasive. This will
lead to greater enunciation, consideration and evaluation of environmental
values and the interests which compete against them. Only then can the
power of interlocutory injunctions operate fairly and effectively in the
environmental context.

